

Chapter 9

The intertemporal consumption-saving problem in discrete and continuous time

In the next two chapters we shall discuss – and apply – the continuous-time version of the basic representative agent model, the Ramsey model. As a preparation for this, the present chapter gives an account of the transition from discrete time to continuous time analysis and of the application of optimal control theory to set up and solve the household’s consumption/saving problem in continuous time.

There are many fields in economics where a setup in continuous time is preferable to one in discrete time. One reason is that continuous time formulations expose the important distinction in dynamic theory between stock and flows in a much clearer way. A second reason is that continuous time opens up for application of the mathematical apparatus of differential equations; this apparatus is more powerful than the corresponding apparatus of difference equations. Similarly, optimal control theory is more developed and potent in its continuous time version than in its discrete time version, considered in Chapter 8. In addition, many formulas in continuous time are simpler than the corresponding ones in discrete time (cf. the growth formulas in Appendix A).

As a vehicle for comparing continuous time modeling with discrete time modeling we consider a standard household consumption/saving problem. How does the household assess the choice between consumption today and consumption in the future? In contrast to the preceding chapters we allow for an arbitrary number of periods within the time horizon of the household. The period length may thus be much shorter than in the previous models. This opens up for capturing additional aspects of economic behavior and for undertaking the transition to

continuous time in a smooth way.

We first specify the market environment in which the optimizing household operates.

9.1 Market conditions

In the Diamond OLG model no loan market was active and wealth effects on consumption or saving through changes in the interest rate were absent. It is different in a setup where agents live for many periods and realistically have a hump-shaped income profile through life. This motivates a look at the financial market and more refined notions related to intertemporal choice.

A perfect loan market Consider a given household or, more generally, a given *contractor*. Suppose the contractor at a given date t wants to take a loan or provide loans to others at the going interest rate, i_t , measured in money terms. So two contractors are involved, a *borrower* and a *lender*. Let the market conditions satisfy the following four criteria:

- (a) the contractors face the same interest rate whether borrowing or lending (that is, monitoring, administration, and other transaction costs are absent);
- (b) there are many contractors on each side and none of them believe to be able to influence the interest rate (the contractors are price takers in the loan market);
- (c) there are no borrowing restrictions other than the requirement on the part of the borrower to comply with her financial commitments;
- (d) the lender faces no default risk (contracts can always be enforced, i.e., the borrower can somehow cost-less be forced to repay the debt with interest on the conditions specified in the contract).

A loan market satisfying these idealized conditions is called a *perfect loan market*. In such a market,

1. various payment streams can be subject to comparison in a simple way; if they have the same present value (PV for short), they are equivalent;
2. any payment stream can be converted into another one with the same present value;

3. payment streams can be compared with the value of stocks.

Consider a payment stream $\{x_t\}_{t=0}^{T-1}$ over T periods, where x_t is the payment in currency at the *end* of period t . Period t runs from time t to time $t + 1$ for $t = 0, 1, \dots, T - 1$. We *ignore uncertainty* and so i_t is the interest rate on a risk-less loan from time t to time $t + 1$. Then the present value, PV_0 , as seen from the beginning of period 0, of the payment stream is defined as¹

$$PV_0 = \frac{x_0}{1 + i_0} + \frac{x_1}{(1 + i_0)(1 + i_1)} + \dots + \frac{x_{T-1}}{(1 + i_0)(1 + i_1) \cdots (1 + i_{T-1})}. \quad (9.1)$$

If Ms. Jones is entitled to the income stream $\{x_t\}_{t=0}^{T-1}$ and at time 0 wishes to buy a durable consumption good of value PV_0 , she can borrow this amount and use a part of the income stream $\{x_t\}_{t=0}^{T-1}$ to repay the debt with interest over the periods $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots, T - 1$. In general, when Jones wishes to have a time profile on the payment stream different from the income stream, she can attain this through appropriate transactions in the loan market, leaving her with any stream of payments of the same present value as the given income stream.

Real versus nominal rate of return In this chapter we maintain the assumption of perfect competition in all markets, i.e., households take all prices as given from the markets. In the *absence of uncertainty*, the various assets (real capital, stocks, loans etc.) in which households invest give the same rate of return in equilibrium. The good which is traded in the loan market can be interpreted as a (risk-less) *bond*. The borrower issues bonds and the lender buys them. In this chapter all bonds are assumed to be short-term, i.e., one-period bonds. For every unit of account borrowed at the end of period $t - 1$, the borrower pays back with certainty $(1 + \text{short-term interest rate})$ units of account at the end of period t . If a borrower wishes to maintain debt through several periods, new bonds are issued at the end of the current period and the obtained loans are spent rolling over the older loans at the going market interest rate. For the lender, who lends in several periods, this is equivalent to offering a variable-rate demand deposit like in a bank.²

Our analysis will be in real terms, that is, inflation-corrected terms. In principle the unit of account is a fixed bundle of consumption goods. In the simple macroeconomic models to be studied in this and most subsequent chapters, such

¹We use “present value” as synonymous with “present discounted value”. As usual our timing convention is such that PV_0 denotes the time-0 value of the payment stream, including the discounted value of the payment (or dividend) indexed by 0.

²Unless otherwise specified, this chapter uses terms like “loan market”, “credit market”, and “bond market” interchangeably. As uncertainty is ignored, it does not matter whether we have personalized loan contracts or tradable securities in mind.

a bundle is reduced to *one* consumption good. The models simply assume there *is* only one consumption good in the economy. In fact, there will only be *one produced good*, “the” output good, which can be used for both consumption and capital investment. Whether our unit of account is seen as the consumption good or the output good is thus immaterial.

The *real* (net) rate of return on an investment is the rate of return in units of the output good. More precisely, the *real rate of return* in period t , r_t , is the (proportionate) rate at which the *real* value of an investment, made at the end of period $t - 1$, has grown after one period.

The link between this rate of return and the more commonplace concept of a nominal rate of return is the following. Imagine that at the end of period $t - 1$ you make a bank deposit of value V_t euro. The *real value* of the deposit when you invest is then V_t/P_{t-1} , where P_{t-1} is the price in euro of the output good at the end of period $t - 1$. If the nominal short-term interest rate is i_t , the deposit is worth $V_{t+1} = V_t(1 + i_t)$ euro at the end of period t . By definition of r_t , the factor by which the deposit in real terms has expanded is

$$1 + r_t = \frac{V_{t+1}/P_t}{V_t/P_{t-1}} = \frac{V_{t+1}/V_t}{P_t/P_{t-1}} = \frac{1 + i_t}{1 + \pi_t}, \quad (9.2)$$

where $\pi_t \equiv (P_t - P_{t-1})/P_{t-1}$ is the inflation rate in period t . So the real (net) *rate* of return on the investment is $r_t = (i_t - \pi_t)/(1 + \pi_t) \approx i_t - \pi_t$ for i_t and π_t “small”. The number $1 + r_t$ is called the real interest *factor* and measures the rate at which current units of output can be traded for units of output one period later.

In the remainder of this chapter we will think in terms of *real* values and completely ignore monetary aspects of the economy.

9.2 Maximizing discounted utility in discrete time

As mentioned, the consumption/saving problem faced by the household is assumed to involve only one consumption good. The composition of consumption in each period is not part of the problem. What remains is the question how to distribute consumption over time.

The intertemporal utility function

A plan for consumption in the periods $0, 1, \dots, T - 1$ is denoted $\{c_t\}_{t=0}^{T-1}$, where c_t is the consumption in period t . We say the plan has *time horizon* T . Period 0 (“the initial period”) need not refer to the “birth” of the household but is just an arbitrary period within the lifetime of the household.

We assume the preferences of the household can be represented by a time-separable intertemporal utility function with a constant utility discount rate and no utility from leisure. The latter assumption implies that the labor supply of the household in each period is inelastic. The time-separability itself just means that the intertemporal utility function is additive, i.e., $U(c_0, c_1, \dots, c_{T-1}) = u^{(0)}(c_0) + u^{(1)}(c_1) + \dots + u^{(T-1)}(c_{T-1})$, where $u^{(t)}(c_t)$ is the utility contribution from period- t consumption, $t = 0, 1, \dots, T - 1$. In addition we assume *geometric utility discounting*, meaning that utility obtained t periods ahead is converted into a present equivalent by multiplying by the *discount factor* $(1 + \rho)^{-t}$, where ρ is a constant utility *discount rate*. So $u^{(t)}(c_t) = u(c_t)(1 + \rho)^{-t}$, where $u(c)$ is a time-independent period utility function. Together, these two assumptions amount to

$$U(c_0, c_1, \dots, c_{T-1}) = u(c_0) + \frac{u(c_1)}{1 + \rho} + \dots + \frac{u(c_{T-1})}{(1 + \rho)^{T-1}} = \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \frac{u(c_t)}{(1 + \rho)^t}. \quad (9.3)$$

The period utility function is assumed to satisfy $u'(c) > 0$ and $u''(c) < 0$. As explained in Box 9.1, only *linear* positive transformations of the period utility function are admissible.

As (9.3) indicates, the number $1 + \rho$ tells how many units of utility in the next period the household insists on “in return” for a decrease of one unit of utility in the current period. So, a $\rho > 0$ will reflect that if the chosen level of consumption is the same in two periods, then the individual always appreciates a marginal unit of consumption higher the earlier it arrives. This explains why ρ is named the *rate of time preference* or, even more to the point, the *rate of impatience*. The utility discount factor, $1/(1 + \rho)^t$, indicates how many units of utility the household is at most willing to give up in period 0 to get one additional unit of utility in period t .³ Admittedly, this assumption that the utility discount rate is a *constant* is questionable. There is a growing body of evidence suggesting that the utility discount rate is usually *not* a constant, but declining with the time distance from the current period to the future periods within the horizon. This phenomenon is referred to as “present bias” or “hyperbolic discounting”. Justified or not, macroeconomics often, as a first approach, ignores the problem and assumes a constant ρ to keep things simple. Most of the time we will follow this practice.

It is generally believed that human beings are impatient and that realism

³Multiplying through in (9.3) by $(1 + \rho)^{-1}$ would make the objective function appear in a way similar to (9.1) in the sense that also the first term in the sum becomes discounted. At the same time the ranking of all possible alternative consumption paths would remain unaffected. For ease of notation, however, we use the form (9.3) which is more standard. Economically, there is no difference.

therefore speaks for assuming ρ positive.⁴ The results to be derived in this chapter do not require a positive ρ , however. So we just impose the definitional constraint in discrete time: $\rho > -1$.

Box 9.1. Admissible transformations of the period utility function

When preferences, as assumed here, can be represented by *discounted utility*, the concept of utility appears at two levels. The function U in (9.3) is defined on the set of alternative feasible consumption paths and corresponds to an ordinary utility function in general microeconomic theory. That is, U will express the same ranking between alternative consumption paths as any increasing transformation of U . The period utility function, u , defined on the consumption in a single period, is a less general concept, requiring that reference to “utility of period utility units” is legitimate. That is, the *size* (not just the sign) of the difference in terms of period utility between two outcomes has significance for choices. Indeed, the essence of the discounted utility hypothesis is that we have, for example,

$$u(c_0) - u(c'_0) > 0.95 [u(c'_1) - u(c_1)] \Leftrightarrow (c_0, c_1) \succ (c'_0, c'_1),$$

meaning that the household, having a utility discount factor $1/(1 + \rho) = 0.95$, strictly prefers consuming (c_0, c_1) to (c'_0, c'_1) in the first two periods, if and only if the utility differences satisfy the indicated inequality. (The notation $x \succ y$ means that x is strictly preferred to y .)

Only a *linear* positive transformation of the utility function u , that is, $v(c) = au(c) + b$, where $a > 0$, leaves the ranking of all possible alternative consumption paths, $\{c_t\}_{t=0}^{T-1}$, unchanged. This is because a linear positive transformation does not affect the *ratios* of marginal utilities (the marginal rates of substitution across time).

The saving problem in discrete time

Suppose the household considered has income from two sources: work and financial wealth. Let a_t denote the real value of (net) financial wealth held by the household at the beginning of period t (a for “assets”). We treat a_t as predetermined at time t and in this respect similar to a variable-interest deposit with a bank. The initial financial wealth, a_0 , is thus *given*, independently of what in

⁴If uncertainty were included in the model, $(1 + \rho)^{-1}$ might be interpreted as (roughly) reflecting the probability of surviving to the next period. In this perspective, $\rho > 0$ is definitely a plausible assumption.

interest rate is formed in the loan market. And a_0 can be positive as well as negative (in the latter case the household is initially in debt).

The labor income of the household in period t is denoted $w_t \geq 0$ and may follow a typical life-cycle pattern, first rising, then more or less stationary, and finally vanishing due to retirement. Thus, in contrast to previous chapters where w_t denoted the real wage per unit of labor, here a broader interpretation of w_t is allowed. Whatever the time profile of the amount of labor delivered by the household through life, in this chapter, where the focus is on individual saving, we regard this time profile, as well as the hourly wage as exogenous. The present interpretation of w_t will coincide with the one in the other chapters if we imagine that the household in each period delivers one unit of labor.

To avoid corner solutions, we impose the No Fast Assumption $\lim_{c \rightarrow 0} u'(c) = \infty$. Since uncertainty is by assumption ruled out, the problem is to choose a plan $(c_0, c_1, \dots, c_{T-1})$ so as to maximize

$$U = \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} u(c_t)(1 + \rho)^{-t} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad (9.4)$$

$$c_t \geq 0, \quad (9.5)$$

$$a_{t+1} = (1 + r_t)a_t + w_t - c_t, \quad a_0 \text{ given}, \quad (9.6)$$

$$a_T \geq 0, \quad (9.7)$$

where r_t is the interest rate. The control region (9.5) reflects the definitional non-negativity of the control variable, consumption. The dynamic equation (9.6) is an accounting relation telling how financial wealth moves over time. Indeed, income in period t is $r_t a_t + w_t$ and saving is then $r_t a_t + w_t - c_t$. Since saving is by definition the same as the increase in financial wealth, $a_{t+1} - a_t$, we obtain (9.6). Finally, the terminal condition (9.7) is a solvency requirement that no financial debt be left over at the terminal date, T . We may call this decision problem the *standard discounted utility maximization problem with a perfect loan market and no uncertainty*.

Solving the problem

To solve the problem, let us use the *substitution method*.⁵ From (9.6) we have $c_t = (1 + r_t)a_t + w_t - a_{t+1}$, for $t = 0, 1, \dots, T - 1$. Substituting this into (9.4), we obtain a function of a_1, a_2, \dots, a_T . Since $u' > 0$, saturation is impossible and so an optimal solution cannot have $a_T > 0$. Hence we can put $a_T = 0$ and the problem is reduced to an essentially unconstrained problem of maximizing a function \tilde{U}

⁵Alternative methods include the *Maximum Principle* as described in the previous chapter or *Dynamic Programming* as described in Math Tools.

w.r.t. a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{T-1} . Thereby we indirectly choose c_0, c_1, \dots, c_{T-2} . Given a_{T-1} , consumption in the last period is trivially given as

$$c_{T-1} = (1 + r_{T-1})a_{T-1} + w_{T-1},$$

ensuring

$$a_T = 0, \tag{9.8}$$

the terminal optimality condition, necessary when $u'(c) > 0$ for all $c \geq 0$ (saturation impossible).

To obtain first-order conditions we put the partial derivatives of \tilde{U} w.r.t. a_{t+1} , $t = 0, 1, \dots, T - 2$, equal to 0:

$$\frac{\partial \tilde{U}}{\partial a_{t+1}} = (1 + \rho)^{-t} [u'(c_t) \cdot (-1) + (1 + \rho)^{-1} u'(c_{t+1})(1 + r_{t+1})] = 0.$$

Reordering gives the Euler equations describing the trade-off between consumption in two succeeding periods,

$$u'(c_t) = (1 + \rho)^{-1} u'(c_{t+1})(1 + r_{t+1}), \quad t = 0, 1, 2, \dots, T - 2. \tag{9.9}$$

One of the implications of this condition is that

$$\rho \begin{matrix} \leq \\ \geq \end{matrix} r_{t+1} \text{ causes } u'(c_t) \begin{matrix} \geq \\ \leq \end{matrix} u'(c_{t+1}), \text{ i.e., } c_t \begin{matrix} \leq \\ \geq \end{matrix} c_{t+1} \tag{9.10}$$

in the optimal plan (due to $u'' < 0$). Absent uncertainty the optimal plan entails either increasing, constant, or decreasing consumption over time depending on whether the rate of time preference is below, equal to, or above the rate of return on saving.

Interpretation The interpretation of (9.9) is as follows. Let the consumption path $(c_0, c_1, \dots, c_{T-1})$ be our “reference path”. Imagine an alternative path which coincides with the reference path except for the periods t and $t + 1$. If it is possible to obtain a higher total discounted utility than in the reference path by varying c_t and c_{t+1} within the constraints (9.5), (9.6), and (9.7), at the same time as consumption in the other periods is kept unchanged, then the reference path cannot be optimal. That is, “local optimality” is a necessary condition for “global optimality”. So the optimal plan must be such that the current utility loss by decreasing consumption c_t by one unit equals the discounted expected utility gain next period by having $1 + r_{t+1}$ extra units available for consumption, namely the gross return on saving one more unit in the current period.

A more concrete interpretation, avoiding the notion of “utility units”, is obtained by rewriting (9.9) as

$$\frac{u'(c_t)}{(1 + \rho)^{-1}u'(c_{t+1})} = 1 + r_{t+1}. \quad (9.11)$$

The left-hand side indicates the marginal rate of substitution, MRS, of period- $(t+1)$ consumption for period- t consumption, namely the increase in period- $(t+1)$ consumption needed to compensate for a one-unit marginal decrease in period- t consumption:

$$MRS_{t+1,t} = -\frac{dc_{t+1}}{dc_t} \Big|_{U=\bar{U}} = \frac{u'(c_t)}{(1 + \rho)^{-1}u'(c_{t+1})}. \quad (9.12)$$

And the right-hand side of (9.11) indicates the marginal rate of transformation, MRT, which is the rate at which the loan market allows the household to shift consumption from period t to period $t + 1$.

So, in an optimal plan MRS must equal MRT. This has implications for the time profile of optimal consumption as indicated by the relationship in (9.10). The Euler equations, (9.9), can also be seen in a comparative perspective. Consider two alternative values of r_{t+1} . The higher interest rate will induce a *negative substitution effect* on current consumption, c_t . There is also an *income effect*, however, and this goes in the *opposite* direction. The higher interest rate makes the present value of a given consumption plan lower. This allows more consumption in all periods for a given total wealth. Moreover, there is generally a third effect of the rise in the interest rate, a *wealth effect*. As indicated by the intertemporal budget constraint in (9.20) below, total wealth includes the present value of expected future after-tax labor earnings and this present value depends *negatively* on the interest rate, cf. (9.15) below.

From the formula (9.12) we see one of the reasons that the assumption of a *constant* utility discount rate is *convenient* (but also restrictive). The marginal rate of substitution between consumption this period and consumption next period is independent of the level of consumption as long as this level is the same in the two periods.

The formula for MRS between consumption this period and consumption *two* periods ahead is

$$MRS_{t+2,t} = -\frac{dc_{t+2}}{dc_t} \Big|_{U=\bar{U}} = \frac{u'(c_t)}{(1 + \rho)^{-2}u'(c_{t+2})}.$$

This displays one of the reasons that the time-separability of the intertemporal utility function is a *strong* assumption. It implies that the trade-off between consumption this period and consumption two periods ahead is independent of consumption in the interim.

Deriving the consumption function when utility is CRRA The first-order conditions (9.9) tell us about the relative consumption levels over time, not the absolute level. The latter is determined by the condition that initial consumption, c_0 , must be highest possible, given that the first-order conditions *and* the constraints (9.6) and (9.7) must be satisfied.

To find an explicit solution we have to specify the period utility function. As an example we choose the CRRA function $u(c) = c^{1-\theta}/(1-\theta)$, where $\theta > 0$.⁶ Moreover we simplify by assuming $r_t = r$, a constant > -1 . Then the Euler equations take the form $(c_{t+1}/c_t)^\theta = (1+r)(1+\rho)^{-1}$ so that

$$\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} = \left(\frac{1+r}{1+\rho} \right)^{1/\theta} \equiv \gamma, \quad (9.13)$$

and thereby $c_t = \gamma^t c_0$, $t = 0, 1, \dots, T-1$. Substituting into the accounting equation (9.6), we thus have $a_{t+1} = (1+r)a_t + w_t - \gamma^t c_0$. By backward substitution we find the solution of this difference equation to be

$$a_t = (1+r)^t \left[a_0 + \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} (1+r)^{-(i+1)} (w_i - \gamma^i c_0) \right].$$

Optimality requires that the left-hand side of this equation vanishes for $t = T$. So we can solve for c_0 :

$$c_0 = \frac{1+r}{\sum_{i=0}^{T-1} \left(\frac{\gamma}{1+r} \right)^i} \left[a_0 + \sum_{i=0}^{T-1} (1+r)^{-(i+1)} w_i \right] = \frac{1+r}{\sum_{i=0}^{T-1} \left(\frac{\gamma}{1+r} \right)^i} (a_0 + h_0), \quad (9.14)$$

where we have inserted the human wealth of the household (present value of expected lifetime labor income) as seen from time zero:

$$h_0 = \sum_{i=0}^{T-1} (1+r)^{-(i+1)} w_i. \quad (9.15)$$

Thus (9.14) says that initial consumption is proportional to initial *total wealth*, the sum of financial wealth and human wealth at time 0. To allow for positive consumption we need $a_0 + h_0 > 0$.

⁶In later sections of this chapter we let the time horizon of the decision maker go to infinity. To ease convergence of an infinite sum of discounted utilities, it is an advantage not to have to bother with additive constants in the period utilities and therefore we write the CRRA function as $c^{1-\theta}/(1-\theta)$ instead of the form, $(c^{1-\theta} - 1)/(1-\theta)$, introduced in Chapter 3. As implied by Box 9.1, the two forms represent the same preferences.

In (9.14) γ is not one of the original parameters, but a derived parameter. To express the consumption function only in terms of the original parameters, note that, by (9.14), the propensity to consume out of total wealth depends on:

$$\sum_{i=0}^{T-1} \left(\frac{\gamma}{1+r} \right)^i = \begin{cases} \frac{1 - \left(\frac{\gamma}{1+r} \right)^T}{1 - \frac{\gamma}{1+r}} & \text{when } \gamma \neq 1+r, \\ \frac{1}{T} & \text{when } \gamma = 1+r, \end{cases} \quad (9.16)$$

where the result for $\gamma \neq 1+r$ follows from the formula for the sum of a finite geometric series. Inserting this together with (9.13) into (9.14), we end up with the expression

$$c_0 = \begin{cases} \frac{(1+r)[1 - (1+\rho)^{-1/\theta}(1+r)^{(1-\theta)/\theta}]}{1 - (1+\rho)^{-T/\theta}(1+r)^{(1-\theta)T/\theta}}(a_0 + h_0) & \text{when } \left(\frac{1+r}{1+\rho} \right)^{1/\theta} \neq 1+r, \\ \frac{1+r}{T}(a_0 + h_0) & \text{when } \left(\frac{1+r}{1+\rho} \right)^{1/\theta} = 1+r. \end{cases} \quad (9.17)$$

This, together with (9.14), thus says:

Result 1: Consumption is proportional to total wealth, and the factor of proportionality, often called the *marginal propensity to consume out of wealth*, depends on the interest rate r , the time horizon T , and the preference parameters ρ and θ , where ρ is the impatience rate and θ is the strength of the preference for consumption smoothing, respectively.

For the subsequent periods we have from (9.13) that

$$c_t = c_0 \left(\left(\frac{1+r}{1+\rho} \right)^{1/\theta} \right)^t, \quad t = 1, \dots, T-1. \quad (9.18)$$

EXAMPLE 1 Consider the special case $\theta = 1$ (i.e., $u(c) = \ln c$) together with $\rho > 0$. The upper case in (9.17) is here the relevant one and period-0 consumption will be

$$c_0 = \frac{(1+r)(1 - (1+\rho)^{-1})}{1 - (1+\rho)^{-T}}(a_0 + h_0) \quad \text{for } \theta = 1.$$

We see that $c_0 \rightarrow (1+r)\rho(1+\rho)^{-1}(a_0 + h_0)$ for $T \rightarrow \infty$, assuming the right-hand side of (9.15) converges for $T \rightarrow \infty$.

We have assumed that payment for consumption occurs at the end of the period at the price 1 per consumption unit. To compare with the corresponding result in continuous time with continuous compounding (see Section 9.4), we might want to have initial consumption in the same present value terms as a_0 and h_0 . That is, we consider $\tilde{c}_0 \equiv c_0(1+r)^{-1} = \rho(1+\rho)^{-1}(a_0 + h_0)$ for $T \rightarrow \infty$.

□

So far the expression (9.17) is only a *candidate* consumption function. But in view of strict concavity of the objective function, (9.17) is indeed the unique optimal solution when $a_0 + h_0 > 0$.

The conclusion from (9.17) and (9.18) is that *consumers look beyond current income*. More precisely:

Result 2: Under the idealized conditions assumed, including a perfect loan market and perfect foresight, and given the marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth shown in (9.17), the time profile of consumption is determined by the total wealth and the interest rate (relative to impatience corrected for the preference for consumption smoothing). The time profile of *income* does not matter because consumption can be smoothed over time by drawing on the loan market.

EXAMPLE 2 Consider the special case $\rho = r > 0$ (and still $\theta = 1$). Again the upper case in (9.17) is the relevant one and period-0 consumption will be

$$c_0 = \frac{r}{1 - (1 + r)^{-T}}(a_0 + h_0).$$

We see that $c_0 \rightarrow r(a_0 + h_0)$ for $T \rightarrow \infty$, assuming the right-hand side of (9.15) converges for $T \rightarrow \infty$. So, with an infinite time horizon current consumption equals the interest on total current wealth. By consuming this the individual or household maintains total wealth intact. This consumption function provides an interpretation of Milton Friedman's *permanent income hypothesis*. Friedman defined "permanent income" as "the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believes it could) while maintaining its wealth intact" (Friedman, 1957). The key point of Friedman's theory was the idea that a random change in current income only affects current consumption to the extent that it affects "permanent income". Replacing Friedman's awkward term "permanent income" by the straightforward "total wealth", this feature is a general aspect of all consumption functions considered in this chapter. In contrast to the theory in this chapter, however, Friedman emphasized credit market imperfections and thought of a "subjective income discount rate" of as much as 33% per year. His interpretation of the empirics was that households adopt a much shorter "horizon" than the remainder of their expected lifetimes (Friedman, 1963, Carroll 2001). \square

If the real interest rate varies over time, the discount factor $(1 + r)^{-(i+1)}$ for a payment made at the end of period i is replaced by $\prod_{j=0}^i (1 + r_j)^{-1}$.

Alternative approach based on the intertemporal budget constraint

There is another approach to the household's saving problem. With its choice of consumption plan the household must act in conformity with its intertemporal

budget constraint (IBC for short). The present value of the consumption plan (c_1, \dots, c_{T-1}) , as seen from time zero, is

$$PV(c_0, c_1, \dots, c_{T-1}) \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \frac{c_t}{\prod_{\tau=0}^t (1 + r_\tau)}. \quad (9.19)$$

This value cannot exceed the household's total initial wealth, $a_0 + h_0$. So the household's *intertemporal budget constraint* is

$$\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \frac{c_t}{\prod_{\tau=0}^t (1 + r_\tau)} \leq a_0 + h_0. \quad (9.20)$$

In this setting the household's problem is to choose its consumption plan so as to maximize U in (9.4) subject to this budget constraint.

This way of stating the problem is equivalent to the approach above based on the dynamic budget condition (9.6) and the solvency condition (9.7). Indeed, given the accounting equation (9.6), the consumption plan of the household will satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint (9.20) if and only if it satisfies the solvency condition (9.7). And there will be strict equality in the intertemporal budget constraint if and only if there is strict equality in the solvency condition (the proof is similar to that of a similar claim relating to the government sector in Chapter 6.2).

Moreover, since in our specific saving problem saturation is impossible, an optimal solution must imply strict equality in (9.20). So it is straightforward to apply the substitution method also within the IBC approach. Alternatively one can introduce the *Lagrange function* associated with the problem of maximizing $U = \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} (1 + \rho)^{-t} u(c_t)$ s.t. (9.20) with strict equality.

Infinite time horizon In the Ramsey model of the next chapter, the idea is used that households may have an *infinite* time horizon. One interpretation of this is that parents care about their children's future welfare and leave bequests accordingly. This gives rise to a series of intergenerational links. The household is then seen as a family dynasty with a time horizon beyond the lifetime of the current members of the family. Barro's bequest model in Chapter 7 is an application of this idea. Given a sufficiently large rate of time preference, it is ensured that the sum of achievable discounted utilities over an infinite horizon is bounded from above.

One could say, of course, that infinity is a long time. The sun will eventually, in some billion years, burn out and life on earth become extinct. Nonetheless, there are several reasons that an infinite time horizon may provide a convenient substitute for finite but remote horizons. First, in many cases the solution to

an optimization problem for T “large” is in a major part of the time horizon close to the solution for $T \rightarrow \infty$.⁷ Second, an infinite time horizon tends to ease aggregation because at any future point in time, remaining time is still infinite. Third, an infinite time horizon may be a convenient notion when in any given period there is always a positive probability that there will be a next period to be concerned about. This probability may be low, but this can be reflected in a high effective utility discount rate. This idea will be applied in chapters 12 and 13.

We may perform the transition to infinite horizon by letting $T \rightarrow \infty$ in the objective function, (9.4) and the intertemporal budget constraint, (9.20). One might think that, in analogy of (9.8) for the case of finite T , the terminal optimality condition for the case of infinite horizon is $\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} a_T = 0$. This is generally not so, however. The reason is that with infinite horizon there is no final date where all debt must be settled. The terminal optimality condition in the present problem with a perfect loan market is simply equivalent to the condition that the intertemporal budget constraint should hold with strict equality.

Like with finite time horizon, the saving problem with infinite time horizon may alternatively be framed in terms of a series of dynamic period-by-period budget identities, in the form (9.6), together with the borrowing limit known as the No-Ponzi-Game condition:

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} a_t \prod_{i=0}^{t-1} (1 + r_i)^{-1} \geq 0.$$

As we saw in Chapter 6.5.2, such a “flow” formulation of the problem is equivalent to the formulation based on the intertemporal budget constraint. We also recall from Chapter 6 that the name Ponzi refers to a guy, Charles Ponzi, who in Boston in the 1920s temporarily became very rich by a loan arrangement based on the chain letter principle. The fact that debts grow without bounds is irrelevant for the lender *if* the borrower can always find new lenders and use their outlay to pay off old lenders with the contracted interest. In the real world, endeavours to establish this sort of financial eternity machine sooner or later break down because the flow of new lenders dries up. Such financial arrangements, in everyday speech known as pyramid companies, are universally illegal.⁸ It is exactly such

⁷The turnpike proposition in Chapter 8 exemplifies this.

⁸A related Danish instance, though on a modest scale, could be read in the Danish newspaper *Politiken* on the 21st of August 1992. “A twenty-year-old female student from Tylstrup in Northern Jutland is charged with fraud. In an ad she offered to tell the reader, for 200 DKK, how to make easy money. Some hundred people responded and received the reply: do like me”.

A more serious present day example is the Wall Street stockbroker, Bernard Madoff, who admitted a Ponzi scheme that is considered to be the largest financial fraud in U.S. history. In 2009 Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in prison. Other examples of large-scale Ponzi games appeared in Albania 1995-97 and Ukraine 2008.

arrangements the No-Ponzi-Game condition precludes.

The terminal optimality condition, known as a *transversality condition*, can be shown⁹ to be

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} (1 + \rho)^{-(t-1)} u'(c_{t-1}) a_t = 0.$$

9.3 Transition to continuous time analysis

In the formulation of a model we have a choice between putting the model in period terms or in continuous time. In the former case, denoted period analysis or discrete time analysis, the run of time is divided into successive periods of equal length, taken as the time-unit. We may index the periods by $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$. Thus, in period analysis financial wealth accumulates according to

$$a_{i+1} - a_i = s_i, \quad a_0 \text{ given,}$$

where s_i is (net) saving in period i .

Multiple compounding per year

With time flowing continuously, we let $a(t)$ refer to financial wealth at time t . Similarly, $a(t + \Delta t)$ refers to financial wealth at time $t + \Delta t$. To begin with, let Δt equal one time unit. Then $a(i\Delta t)$ equals $a(i)$ and is of the same value as a_i . Consider the *forward* first difference in a , $\Delta a(t) \equiv a(t + \Delta t) - a(t)$. It makes sense to consider this change in a in relation to the length of the time interval involved, that is, to consider the *ratio* $\Delta a(t)/\Delta t$.

Now, *keep the time unit unchanged*, but let the length of the time interval $[t, t + \Delta t)$ approach zero, i.e., let $\Delta t \rightarrow 0$. When a is a differentiable function of t , we have

$$\lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{\Delta a(t)}{\Delta t} = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{a(t + \Delta t) - a(t)}{\Delta t} = \frac{da(t)}{dt},$$

where $da(t)/dt$, often written $\dot{a}(t)$, is known as the *time derivative of a* at the point t . Wealth accumulation in continuous time can then be written

$$\dot{a}(t) = s(t), \quad a(0) = a_0 \text{ given,} \quad (9.21)$$

where $s(t)$ is the saving flow (saving intensity) at time t . For Δt “small” we have the approximation $\Delta a(t) \approx \dot{a}(t)\Delta t = s(t)\Delta t$. In particular, for $\Delta t = 1$ we have $\Delta a(t) = a(t + 1) - a(t) \approx s(t)$.

⁹The proof is similar to that given in Chapter 8, Appendix C.

As time unit choose one year. Going back to discrete time, if wealth grows at a constant rate g per year, then after i periods of length one year, with annual compounding, we have

$$a_i = a_0(1 + g)^i, \quad i = 0, 1, 2, \dots \quad (9.22)$$

If instead compounding (adding saving to the principal) occurs n times a year, then after i periods of length $1/n$ year and a growth rate of g/n per such period, we have

$$a_i = a_0\left(1 + \frac{g}{n}\right)^i. \quad (9.23)$$

With t still denoting time measured in years passed since date 0, we have $i = nt$ periods. Substituting into (9.23) gives

$$a(t) = a_{nt} = a_0\left(1 + \frac{g}{n}\right)^{nt} = a_0 \left[\left(1 + \frac{1}{m}\right)^m \right]^{gt}, \quad \text{where } m \equiv \frac{n}{g}.$$

We keep g and t fixed, but let $n \rightarrow \infty$. Thus $m \rightarrow \infty$. In the limit there is continuous compounding and we get

$$a(t) = a_0 e^{gt}, \quad (9.24)$$

where e is a mathematical constant called the base of the natural logarithm and defined as $e \equiv \lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} (1 + 1/m)^m \simeq 2.7182818285\dots$

The formula (9.24) is the continuous-time analogue to the discrete time formula (9.22) with annual compounding. A geometric growth factor, $(1 + g)^i$, is replaced by an exponential growth factor, e^{gt} , and this growth factor is valid for any t in the time interval $(-\tau_1, \tau_2)$ for which the growth rate of a equals the constant g (τ_1 and τ_2 being some positive real numbers).

We can also view the formulas (9.22) and (9.24) as the solutions to a difference equation and a differential equation, respectively. Thus, (9.22) is the solution to the linear difference equation $a_{i+1} = (1 + g)a_i$, given the initial value a_0 . And (9.24) is the solution to the linear differential equation $\dot{a}(t) = ga(t)$, given the initial condition $a(0) = a_0$. Now consider a time-dependent growth rate, $g(t)$, a continuous function of t . The corresponding differential equation is $\dot{a}(t) = g(t)a(t)$ and it has the solution

$$a(t) = a(0)e^{\int_0^t g(\tau)d\tau}, \quad (9.25)$$

where the exponent, $\int_0^t g(\tau)d\tau$, is the definite integral of the function $g(\tau)$ from 0 to t . The result (9.25) is called the *accumulation formula* in continuous time and the factor $e^{\int_0^t g(\tau)d\tau}$ is called the *growth factor* or the *accumulation factor*.¹⁰

¹⁰Sometimes the accumulation factor with time-dependent growth rate is written in a different way, see Appendix B.

Compound interest and discounting in continuous time

Let $r(t)$ denote the *short-term real interest rate in continuous time* at time t . To clarify what is meant by this, consider a deposit of $V(t)$ euro in a bank at time t . If the general price level in the economy at time t is $P(t)$ euro, the *real value* of the deposit is $a(t) = V(t)/P(t)$ at time t . By definition the *real rate of return* on the deposit in continuous time (with continuous compounding) at time t is the (proportionate) instantaneous rate at which the real value of the deposit expands per time unit when there is no withdrawal from the account. Thus, if the instantaneous nominal interest rate is $i(t)$, we have $\dot{V}(t)/V(t) = i(t)$ and so, by the fraction rule in continuous time (cf. Appendix A),

$$r(t) = \frac{\dot{a}(t)}{a(t)} = \frac{\dot{V}(t)}{V(t)} - \frac{\dot{P}(t)}{P(t)} = i(t) - \pi(t), \quad (9.26)$$

where $\pi(t) \equiv \dot{P}(t)/P(t)$ is the instantaneous inflation rate. In contrast to the corresponding formula in discrete time, this formula is exact. Sometimes $i(t)$ and $r(t)$ are referred to as the nominal and real *force of interest*.

Calculating the terminal value of the deposit at time $t_1 > t_0$, given its value at time t_0 and assuming no withdrawal in the time interval $[t_0, t_1]$, the accumulation formula (9.25) immediately yields

$$a(t_1) = a(t_0)e^{\int_{t_0}^{t_1} r(t)dt}.$$

When calculating *present values* in continuous time, we use compound discounting. We reverse the accumulation formula and go from the compounded or terminal value to the present value, $a(t_0)$. Similarly, given a consumption plan $(c(t))_{t=t_0}^{t_1}$, the present value of this plan as seen from time t_0 is

$$PV = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} c(t) e^{-rt} dt, \quad (9.27)$$

presupposing a constant interest rate, r . Instead of the geometric discount factor, $1/(1+r)^t$, from discrete time analysis, we have here an exponential discount factor, $1/(e^{rt}) = e^{-rt}$, and instead of a sum, an integral. When the interest rate varies over time, (9.27) is replaced by

$$PV = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} c(t) e^{-\int_{t_0}^t r(\tau)d\tau} dt.$$

In (9.27) $c(t)$ is discounted by $e^{-rt} \approx (1+r)^{-t}$ for r “small”. This might not seem analogue to the discrete-time discounting in (9.19) where it is c_{t-1} that is

discounted by $(1 + r)^{-t}$, assuming a constant interest rate. When taking into account the timing convention that payment for c_{t-1} in period $t - 1$ occurs at the end of the period (= time t), there is no discrepancy, however, since the continuous-time analogue to this payment is $c(t)$.

The range for particular parameter values

The allowed range for parameters may change when we go from discrete time to continuous time with continuous compounding. For example, the usual equation for aggregate capital accumulation in continuous time is

$$\dot{K}(t) = I(t) - \delta K(t), \quad K(0) = K_0 \text{ given}, \quad (9.28)$$

where $K(t)$ is the capital stock, $I(t)$ is the gross investment at time t and $\delta \geq 0$ is the (physical) capital depreciation rate. Unlike in period analysis, now $\delta > 1$ is conceptually allowed. Indeed, suppose for simplicity that $I(t) = 0$ for all $t \geq 0$; then (9.28) gives $K(t) = K_0 e^{-\delta t}$. This formula is meaningful for any $\delta \geq 0$. Usually, the time unit used in continuous time macro models is one year (or, in business cycle theory, rather a quarter of a year) and then a realistic value of δ is of course < 1 (say, between 0.05 and 0.10). However, if the time unit applied to the model is large (think of a Diamond-style OLG model), say 30 years, then $\delta > 1$ may fit better, empirically, if the model is converted into continuous time with the same time unit. Suppose, for example, that physical capital has a half-life of 10 years. With 30 years as our time unit, inserting into the formula $1/2 = e^{-\delta/3}$ gives $\delta = (\ln 2) \cdot 3 \simeq 2$.

In many simple macromodels, where the level of aggregation is high, the relative price of a unit of physical capital in terms of the consumption good is 1 and thus constant. More generally, if we let the relative price of the capital good in terms of the consumption good at time t be $p(t)$ and allow $\dot{p}(t) \neq 0$, then we have to distinguish between the physical depreciation of capital, δ , and the *economic depreciation*, that is, the loss in economic value of a machine per time unit. The economic depreciation will be $d(t) = p(t)\delta - \dot{p}(t)$, namely the economic value of the physical wear and tear (and technological obsolescence, say) minus the capital gain (positive or negative) on the machine.

Other variables and parameters that by definition are bounded from below in discrete time analysis, but not so in continuous time analysis, include rates of return and discount rates in general.

Stocks and flows

An advantage of continuous time analysis is that it forces the analyst to make a clear distinction between *stocks* (say wealth) and *flows* (say consumption or

saving). Recall, a *stock* variable is a variable measured as a quantity at a given point in time. The variables $a(t)$ and $K(t)$ considered above are stock variables. A *flow* variable is a variable measured as quantity *per time unit* at a given point in time. The variables $s(t)$, $\dot{K}(t)$, and $I(t)$ are flow variables.

One can not add a stock and a flow, because they have *different denominations*. What is meant by this? The elementary measurement units in economics are *quantity units* (so many machines of a certain kind or so many liters of oil or so many units of payment, for instance) and *time units* (months, quarters, years). On the basis of these elementary units we can form *composite measurement units*. Thus, the capital stock, K , has the denomination “quantity of machines”, whereas investment, I , has the denomination “quantity of machines per time unit” or, shorter, “quantity/time”. A growth rate or interest rate has the denomination “(quantity/time)/quantity” = “time⁻¹”. If we change our time unit, say from quarters to years, the value of a flow variable as well as a growth rate is changed, in this case quadrupled (presupposing annual compounding).

In continuous time analysis expressions like $K(t) + I(t)$ or $K(t) + \dot{K}(t)$ are thus illegitimate. But one can write $K(t + \Delta t) \approx K(t) + (I(t) - \delta K(t))\Delta t$, or $\dot{K}(t)\Delta t \approx (I(t) - \delta K(t))\Delta t$. In the same way, suppose a bath tub at time t contains 50 liters of water and that the tap pours $\frac{1}{2}$ liter per second into the tub for some time. Then a sum like $50 \ell + \frac{1}{2} (\ell/\text{sec})$ does not make sense. But the *amount* of water in the tub after one minute is meaningful. This amount would be $50 \ell + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 60 ((\ell/\text{sec}) \times \text{sec}) = 80 \ell$. In analogy, economic flow variables in continuous time should be seen as *intensities* defined for every t in the time interval considered, say the time interval $[0, T)$ or perhaps $[0, \infty)$. For example, when we say that $I(t)$ is “investment” at time t , this is really a short-hand for “investment intensity” at time t . The actual investment in a time interval $[t_0, t_0 + \Delta t)$, i.e., the invested amount *during* this time interval, is the integral, $\int_{t_0}^{t_0 + \Delta t} I(t) dt \approx I(t_0)\Delta t$. Similarly, the flow of individual saving, $s(t)$, should be interpreted as the saving *intensity* (or saving *density*), at time t . The actual saving in a time interval $[t_0, t_0 + \Delta t)$, i.e., the saved (or accumulated) amount during this time interval, is the integral, $\int_{t_0}^{t_0 + \Delta t} s(t) dt$. If Δt is “small”, this integral is approximately equal to the product $s(t_0) \cdot \Delta t$, cf. the hatched area in Fig. 9.1.

The notation commonly used in discrete time analysis blurs the distinction between stocks and flows. Expressions like $a_{i+1} = a_i + s_i$, without further comment, are usual. Seemingly, here a stock, wealth, and a flow, saving, are added. In fact, however, it is wealth at the beginning of period i and the saved *amount during* period i that are added: $a_{i+1} = a_i + s_i \cdot \Delta t$. The tacit condition is that the period length, Δt , is the time unit, so that $\Delta t = 1$. But suppose that, for example in a business cycle model, the period length is one quarter, but the time unit is one year. Then saving in quarter i is $s_i = (a_{i+1} - a_i) \cdot 4$ per year.




Figure 9.1: With Δt small the integral of $s(t)$ from t_0 to $t_0 + \Delta t \approx$ the hatched area.

The choice between discrete and continuous time formulation

In empirical economics, data typically come in discrete time form and data for flow variables typically refer to periods of constant length. One could argue that this discrete form of the data speaks for period analysis rather than continuous time modelling. And the fact that economic actors often think, decide, and plan in period terms, may seem a good reason for putting at least microeconomic analysis in period terms. Nonetheless real time is continuous. Moreover, as for instance Allen (1967) argued, it can hardly be said that the *mass* of economic actors think and decide with the same time distance between successive decisions and actions. In macroeconomics we consider the *sum* of the actions. In this perspective the continuous time approach has the advantage of allowing variation *within* the usually artificial periods in which the data are chopped up. In addition, centralized asset markets equilibrate very fast and respond almost immediately to new information. For such markets a formulation in continuous time seems a good approximation.

There is also a risk that a discrete time model may generate *artificial* oscillations over time. Suppose the “true” model of some mechanism is given by the differential equation

$$\dot{x} = \alpha x, \quad \alpha < -1. \quad (9.29)$$

The solution is $x(t) = x(0)e^{\alpha t}$ which converges in a monotonic way toward 0 for $t \rightarrow \infty$. However, the analyst takes a discrete time approach and sets up the seemingly “corresponding” discrete time model

$$x_{t+1} - x_t = \alpha x_t.$$

This yields the difference equation $x_{t+1} = (1+\alpha)x_t$, where $1+\alpha < 0$. The solution is $x_t = (1+\alpha)^t x_0$, $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$. As $(1+\alpha)^t$ is positive when t is even and negative when t is odd, oscillations arise (together with divergence if $\alpha < -2$) in spite of

the “true” model generating monotonous convergence towards the steady state $x^* = 0$.

This potential problem can always be avoided, however, by choosing a sufficiently *short* period length in the discrete time model. The solution to a differential equation can always be obtained as the limit of the solution to a corresponding difference equation for the period length approaching zero. In the case of (9.29), the approximating difference equation is $x_{i+1} = (1 + \alpha\Delta t)x_i$, where Δt is the period length, $i = t/\Delta t$, and $x_i = x(i\Delta t)$. By choosing Δt small enough, the solution comes arbitrarily close to the solution of (9.29). It is generally more difficult to go in the opposite direction and find a differential equation that approximates a given difference equation. But the problem is solved as soon as a differential equation has been found that has the initial difference equation as an approximating difference equation.

From the point of view of the economic contents, the choice between discrete time and continuous time may be a matter of taste. Yet, everything else equal, the clearer distinction between stocks and flows in continuous time than in discrete time speaks for the former. From the point of view of mathematical convenience, the continuous time formulation, which has worked so well in the natural sciences, is preferable. At least this is so in the absence of uncertainty. For problems where uncertainty is important, discrete time formulations are easier to work with unless one is familiar with stochastic calculus.¹¹

9.4 Maximizing discounted utility in continuous time

9.4.1 The saving problem in continuous time

In continuous time the analogue to the intertemporal utility function, (9.3), is

$$U_0 = \int_0^T u(c(t))e^{-\rho t} dt. \quad (9.30)$$

In this context it is common to name the utility flow, u , the *instantaneous utility function*. We still assume that $u' > 0$ and $u'' < 0$. The analogue in continuous time to the intertemporal budget constraint (9.20) is

$$\int_0^T c(t)e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau} dt \leq a_0 + h_0, \quad (9.31)$$

¹¹In the latter case, Nobel laureate Robert C. Merton argues in favor of a continuous time formulation (Merton, 1975).

where, as before, a_0 is the historically given initial financial wealth, while h_0 is the given human wealth,

$$h_0 = \int_0^T w(t) e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau) d\tau} dt. \quad (9.32)$$

The household's problem is then to choose a consumption plan $(c(t))_{t=0}^T$ so as to maximize discounted utility, U_0 , subject to the budget constraint (9.31).

Infinite time horizon Transition to infinite horizon is performed by letting $T \rightarrow \infty$ in (9.30), (9.31), and (9.32). In the limit the household's, or dynasty's, problem becomes one of choosing a plan, $(c(t))_{t=0}^\infty$, which maximizes

$$U_0 = \int_0^\infty u(c(t)) e^{-\rho t} dt \quad \text{s.t.} \quad (9.33)$$

$$\int_0^\infty c(t) e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau) d\tau} dt \leq a_0 + h_0, \quad (\text{IBC})$$

where h_0 emerges by letting T in (9.32) approach ∞ . With an infinite horizon there may exist technically feasible paths along which the integrals in (9.30), (9.31), and (9.32) go to ∞ for $T \rightarrow \infty$. In that case maximization is not well-defined. However, the assumptions we are going to make when working with infinite horizon will guarantee that the integrals converge as $T \rightarrow \infty$ (or at least that *some* feasible paths have $-\infty < U_0 < \infty$, while the remainder have $U_0 = -\infty$ and are thus clearly inferior). The essence of the matter is that the rate of time preference, ρ , must be assumed sufficiently high.

Generally we define a person as *solvent* if she is able to meet her financial obligations as they fall due. Each person is considered "small" relative to the economy as a whole. As long as all agents in an economy with a perfect loan market remain "small", they will in general equilibrium remain solvent if and only if their net debt does not exceed the present value of future primary saving.¹² Denoting by d_0 net debt at time 0, i.e., $d_0 \equiv -a_0$, the solvency requirement as seen from time 0 is

$$d_0 \leq \int_0^\infty (w(t) - c(t)) e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau) d\tau} dt,$$

where the right-hand side is the present value of future primary saving. By the definition in (9.32), we see that this requirement is identical to the intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) which consequently expresses solvency.

¹²By *primary* saving is meant the difference between current non-interest income and current consumption, where non-interest income means labor income and transfers after tax.

The budget constraint in flow terms

The method which is particularly apt for solving intertemporal decision problems in continuous time is based on the mathematical discipline *optimal control theory*. To apply the method, we have to convert the household's budget constraint from the present-value formulation considered above into flow terms.

By mere accounting, in every short time interval $(t, t + \Delta t)$ the household's consumption plus saving equals the household's total income, that is,

$$(c(t) + \dot{a}(t))\Delta t = (r(t)a(t) + w(t))\Delta t.$$

Here, $\dot{a}(t) \equiv da(t)/dt$ is the increase per time unit in financial wealth, and thereby the saving intensity, at time t (assuming no robbery). If we divide through by Δt and rearrange, we get for all $t \geq 0$

$$\dot{a}(t) = r(t)a(t) + w(t) - c(t), \quad a(0) = a_0 \text{ given.} \quad (9.34)$$

This equation in itself is just a dynamic budget identity. It tells how much and in which direction the financial wealth is changing due to the difference between current income and current consumption. The equation *per se* does not impose any restriction on consumption over time. If this equation were the only "restriction", one could increase consumption indefinitely by incurring an increasing debt without limits. It is not until we add the requirement of solvency that we get a *constraint*. When $T < \infty$, the relevant solvency requirement is $a(T) \geq 0$ (that is, no debt is left over at the terminal date). This is equivalent to satisfying the intertemporal budget constraint (9.31).

When $T \rightarrow \infty$, the relevant solvency requirement is the No-Ponzi-Game condition

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} a(t)e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau} \geq 0. \quad (\text{NPG})$$

This condition says that the present value of net debt, measured as $-a(t)$, infinitely far out in the future, is not permitted to be positive. We have the following equivalency:

PROPOSITION 1 (*equivalence of NPG condition and intertemporal budget constraint*) Let the time horizon be infinite and assume that the integral (9.32) remains finite for $T \rightarrow \infty$. Then, given the accounting relation (9.34), we have:

- (i) the requirement (NPG) is satisfied if and only if the intertemporal budget constraint, (IBC), is satisfied; and
- (ii) there is strict equality in (NPG) if and only if there is strict equality in (IBC).

Proof. See Appendix C.

The condition (NPG) does not preclude that the household, or family dynasty, can remain in debt. This would also be an unnatural requirement as the dynasty

is infinitely-lived. The condition does imply, however, that there is an upper bound for the speed whereby debt can increase in the long term. The NPG condition says that in the long term, debts are not allowed to grow at a rate as high as (or higher than) the interest rate.

To understand the implication, consider the case with a constant interest rate $r > 0$. Assume that the household at time t has net debt $d(t) > 0$, i.e., $a(t) \equiv -d(t) < 0$. If $d(t)$ were persistently growing at a rate equal to or greater than the interest rate, (NPG) would be violated.¹³ Equivalently, one can interpret (NPG) as an assertion that lenders will only issue loans if the borrowers in the long run cover their interest payments by other means than by taking up new loans. In this way, it is avoided that $\dot{d}(t) \geq rd(t)$ in the long run. In brief, the borrowers are not allowed to run a Ponzi Game.

9.4.2 Solving the saving problem

The household's consumption/saving problem is one of choosing a path for the *control variable* $c(t)$ so as to maximize a *criterion function*, in the form of an integral, subject to constraints that include a first-order differential equation where the control variable enters, namely (9.34). Choosing a time path for the control variable, this differential equation determines the evolution of the *state variable*, $a(t)$. Optimal control theory, which in Chapter 8 was applied to a related discrete time problem, offers a well-suited apparatus for solving this kind of optimization problems. We will make use of a special case of Pontryagin's *Maximum Principle* (the basic tool of optimal control theory) in its continuous time version. We shall consider both the finite and the infinite horizon case. The only regularity condition required is that the exogenous variables, here $r(t)$ and $w(t)$, are piecewise continuous and that the control variable, here $c(t)$, is piecewise continuous and take values within some given set $\mathbb{C} \subset \mathbb{R}$, called the *control region*.

For a fixed $T < \infty$ the problem is: choose a plan $(c(t))_{t=0}^T$ that maximizes

$$U_0 = \int_0^T u(c(t))e^{-\rho t} dt \quad \text{s.t.} \quad (9.35)$$

$$c(t) \geq 0, \quad (\text{control region}) \quad (9.36)$$

$$\dot{a}(t) = r(t)a(t) + w(t) - c(t), \quad a(0) = a_0 \text{ given,} \quad (9.37)$$

$$a(T) \geq 0. \quad (\text{solvency requirement}) \quad (9.38)$$

With an infinite time horizon, the upper limit of integration, T , in (9.35) is

¹³Starting from a given initial positive debt, d_0 , when $\dot{d}(t)/d(t) \geq r > 0$, we have $d(t) \geq d_0 e^{rt}$ so that $d(t)e^{-rt} \geq d_0 > 0$ for all $t \geq 0$. Consequently, $a(t)e^{-rt} = -d(t)e^{-rt} \leq -d_0 < 0$ for all $t \geq 0$, that is, $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} a(t)e^{-rt} < 0$, which violates (NPG).

interpreted as going to infinity, and the solvency condition (9.38) is replaced by

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} a(t) e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau) d\tau} \geq 0. \quad (\text{NPG})$$

Let I denote the time interval $[0, T]$ if $T < \infty$ and the time interval $[0, \infty)$ if $T \rightarrow \infty$. If $c(t)$ and the corresponding evolution of $a(t)$ fulfil (9.36) and (9.37) for all $t \in I$ as well as the relevant solvency condition, we call $(a(t), c(t))_{t=0}^T$ an *admissible path*. If a given admissible path $(a(t), c(t))_{t=0}^T$ solves the problem, it is referred to as an *optimal path*.¹⁴ We assume that $w(t) > 0$ for all t . No condition on the impatience parameter ρ is imposed (in this chapter).

Necessary conditions for an optimal plan

The solution procedure for this problem is as follows:¹⁵

1. We set up the *current-value Hamiltonian function* (often just called the *current-value Hamiltonian* or even just the *Hamiltonian*):

$$H(a, c, \lambda, t) \equiv u(c) + \lambda(ra + w - c),$$

where λ is the *adjoint variable* (also called the *co-state variable*) associated with the dynamic constraint (9.37).¹⁶ That is, λ is an auxiliary variable which is a function of t and is analogous to the Lagrange multiplier in static optimization.

2. At every point in time, we maximize the Hamiltonian w.r.t. the *control variable*. Focusing on an *interior* optimal path,¹⁷ we calculate

$$\frac{\partial H}{\partial c} = u'(c) - \lambda = 0.$$

For every $t \in I$ we thus have the condition

$$u'(c(t)) = \lambda(t). \quad (9.39)$$

¹⁴The term “path”, sometimes “trajectory”, is common in the natural sciences for a solution to a differential equation because one may think of this solution as the path of a particle moving in two- or three-dimensional space.

¹⁵The four-step solution procedure below is applicable to a large class of dynamic optimization problems in continuous time, see Math tools.

¹⁶The explicit dating of the time-dependent variables a , c , and λ is omitted where not needed for clarity.

¹⁷A path, $(a_t, c_t)_{t=0}^T$, is an *interior* path if for no $t \in [0, T)$, the pair (a_t, c_t) is at a boundary point of the set of admissible such pairs. In the present case where a_t is not constrained, except at $t = T$, $(a_t, c_t)_{t=0}^T$, is an *interior* path if $c_t > 0$ for all $t \in [0, T)$.

3. We calculate the partial derivative of H with respect to the *state variable* and put it equal to minus the time derivative of λ plus the discount rate (as it appears in the integrand of the criterion function) multiplied by λ , that is

$$\frac{\partial H}{\partial a} = \lambda r = -\dot{\lambda} + \rho\lambda.$$

This says that, for all $t \in I$, the adjoint variable λ should fulfil the differential equation

$$\dot{\lambda}(t) = (\rho - r(t))\lambda(t). \quad (9.40)$$

4. We now apply the *Maximum Principle* which in the present context says: an interior optimal path $(a(t), c(t))_{t=0}^T$ will satisfy that there exists a continuous function $\lambda = \lambda(t)$ such that for all $t \in I$, (9.39) and (9.40) hold along the path, and the *transversality condition*,

$$\begin{aligned} a(T)\lambda(T) &= 0, \text{ if } T < \infty, \text{ and} \\ \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} a(t)\lambda(t)e^{-\rho t} &= 0, \text{ if } "T = \infty", \end{aligned} \quad (\text{TVC})$$

is satisfied.

The transversality condition stated for the *finite* horizon case is general and simply a part of the Maximum Principle. But for the *infinite* horizon case no such *general* mathematical theorem exists. Fortunately, for the household's intertemporal consumption-saving problem, the condition stated in the second row of (TVC) turns out to be the true *necessary* transversality condition, as we shall see at the end of this section.

Let us provide an interpretation of the set of optimality conditions. Overall, the Maximum Principle characterizes an optimal path as a path that for every t implies maximization of the Hamiltonian associated with the problem and at the same time satisfies a certain terminal condition. Intuitively, maximization of the Hamiltonian at every t is needed because the Hamiltonian weighs the direct contribution of the marginal unit of the control variable to the criterion function in the "right" way relative to the indirect contribution, which comes from the generated change in the state variable (here financial wealth). In the present context "right" means that the trade-off between consuming or saving the marginal unit of account is described in accordance with the opportunities offered by the rate of return vis-a-vis the time preference rate, ρ . Indeed, the optimality condition (9.39) can be seen as a $MC = MB$ condition in utility terms: on the margin one unit of account (here the consumption good) must be equally valuable in its two uses: consumption and wealth accumulation.

Together with the optimality condition (9.40), this signifies that the adjoint variable λ can be interpreted as the *shadow price* (measured in units of current

utility) of financial wealth along the optimal path.¹⁸ Reordering the differential equation (9.40) gives

$$\frac{r\lambda + \dot{\lambda}}{\lambda} = \rho. \quad (9.41)$$

This can be interpreted as a no-arbitrage condition. The left-hand side gives the *actual* rate of return, measured in utility units, on the marginal unit of saving. Indeed, $r\lambda$ can be seen as a dividend and $\dot{\lambda}$ as a capital gain. The right-hand side is the *required* marginal rate of return in utility units, ρ . Along an optimal path the two must coincide. The household is willing to save the marginal unit of income only up to the point where the actual return on saving equals the required return.

We may alternatively write the no-arbitrage condition as

$$r = \rho - \frac{\dot{\lambda}}{\lambda}. \quad (9.42)$$

On the left-hand-side appears the actual *real* rate of return on saving and on the right-hand-side the *required real* rate of return. The intuition behind this condition can be seen in the following way. Suppose Mr. Jones makes a deposit of V utility units in a “bank” that offers a proportionate rate of expansion of the utility value of the deposit equal to i (assuming no withdrawal occurs), i.e.,

$$\frac{\dot{V}}{V} = i.$$

This is the actual *utility* rate of return, a kind of “nominal interest rate”. To calculate the corresponding “real interest rate” let the “nominal price” of a consumption good be λ utility units. Dividing the number of invested utility units, V , by λ , we get the *real* value, $m = V/\lambda$, of the deposit at time t . The actual *real* rate of return on the deposit is therefore

$$r = \frac{\dot{m}}{m} = \frac{\dot{V}}{V} - \frac{\dot{\lambda}}{\lambda} = i - \frac{\dot{\lambda}}{\lambda}. \quad (9.43)$$

Mr. Jones is just willing to save the marginal unit of income if this actual real rate of return on saving equals the required real rate, that is, the right-hand side of (9.42). In turn, this necessitates that the “nominal interest rate”, i , in (9.43) equals the required nominal rate, ρ . The formula (9.43) is analogue to the discrete-time formula (9.2) except that the unit of account in (9.43) is current utility while in (9.2) it is currency.

¹⁸Recall, a *shadow price* (measured in some unit of account) of a good is, from the point of view of the buyer, the maximum number of units of account that the optimizing buyer is willing to offer for one extra unit of the good.

The first-order conditions (9.39) and (9.40) thus say in what local direction the pair $(a(t), \lambda(t))_{t=0}^T$ must move in the (a, λ) plane to be optimal. This “local optimality” condition, which must hold at every t , is generally satisfied by infinitely many admissible paths. In addition, we need “overall optimality”. This requires that the “general level” of the path $(a(t), \lambda(t))_{t=0}^T$ is such that a specific *terminal* condition holds, namely the transversality condition (TVC).

Let us see how close to an intuitive understanding of (TVC) as a necessary terminal optimality condition we can come. Consider first the *finite horizon* case $T < \infty$. The solvency requirement is $a(T) \geq 0$. Here (TVC) claims that $a(T)\lambda(T) = 0$ is needed for optimality. This condition is equivalent to

$$a(T)\lambda(T)e^{-\rho T} = 0, \quad (9.44)$$

since multiplying by a positive constant, $e^{-\rho T}$, does not change the condition. The form (9.44) has the advantage of being “parallel” to the transversality condition for the case $T \rightarrow \infty$. Transparency is improved if we insert (9.39) to get

$$a(T)u'(c(T))e^{-\rho T} = 0. \quad (9.45)$$

Note that the factor $u'(c(T))e^{-\rho T} > 0$.

Could an optimal plan have “ $>$ ” in (9.45) instead of “ $=$ ”? That would require $a(T) > 0$. But then, within some positive time interval, consumption could be increased without the ensuing decrease in $a(T)$ violating the solvency requirement $a(T) \geq 0$. Thereby, discounted utility, U_0 , would be increased, which contradicts that the considered plan is an optimal plan.

Could an optimal plan have “ $<$ ” in (9.45) instead of “ $=$ ”? That would require $a(T) < 0$. Thereby the solvency requirement $a(T) \geq 0$ would be violated. So the plan is not admissible and therefore cannot be optimal.

From these two observations we conclude that with finite horizon, (9.45) is necessary for optimality. This is then also true for the original $a(T)\lambda(T) = 0$ condition in (TVC). So far so good.

Consider now the *infinite horizon* case $T \rightarrow \infty$. Here our intuitive reasoning will be more shaky, hence a precise proposition with a formal proof will finally be presented. Anyway, in (9.45) let $T \rightarrow \infty$ so as to give the condition

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} a(T)u'(c(T))e^{-\rho T} = 0. \quad (9.46)$$

By (9.39), this says the same as (TVC) for “ $T = \infty$ ” does. In analogy with the finite horizon case, a plan that violates the condition (9.46), by having “ $>$ ” instead of “ $=$ ”, reveals scope for improvement. Such a plan would amount to “postponing possible consumption *forever*”, which cannot be optimal. The postponed consumption possibilities could be transformed to consumption on earth in real time by reducing $a(T)$ somewhat, without violating (NPG).

Finally, our intuitive belief is again that an optimal plan, violating (9.46) by having “<” instead “=”, can be ruled out because it will defy the solvency requirement, that is, the (NPG) condition.

These intuitive considerations do not settle the issue whether (TVC) is really necessary for optimality, and if so, why? Luckily, regarding the household’s intertemporal consumption-saving problem a simple formal proof, building on the household’s intertemporal budget constraint, exists.

PROPOSITION 2 (*the household’s necessary transversality condition with infinite time horizon*) Let $T \rightarrow \infty$ in the criterion function (9.35) and assume that the human wealth integral (9.32) converges (and thereby remains bounded) for $T \rightarrow \infty$. Assume further that the adjoint variable, $\lambda(t)$, satisfies the first-order conditions (9.39) and (9.40). Then:

- (i) In an optimal plan, (NPG) is satisfied with strict equality.
- (ii) (TVC) is satisfied if and only if (NPG) is satisfied with strict equality.

Proof. (i) By definition, an admissible plan must satisfy (NPG) and, in view of Proposition 1 in Section 9.4.1, thereby also the household’s intertemporal budget constraint, (IBC). To be optimal, an admissible plan must satisfy (IBC) with strict equality; otherwise there would be scope for improving the plan by raising $c(t)$ a little in some time interval without decreasing $c(t)$ in other time intervals. By Proposition 1 strict equality in (IBC) is equivalent to strict equality in (NPG). Hence, in an optimal plan, (NPG) is satisfied with strict equality. (ii) See Appendix D. \square

In view of this proposition, we can write the transversality condition for $T \rightarrow \infty$ as the NPG condition with strict equality:

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} a(t) e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau) d\tau} = 0. \quad (\text{TVC}')$$

This offers a nice economically interpretable formulation of the necessary transversality condition. In view of the equivalence of the NPG condition with strict equality and the IBC with strict equality, established in Proposition 1, the transversality condition for $T \rightarrow \infty$ can also be written this way:

$$\int_0^{\infty} c(t) e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau) d\tau} dt = a_0 + h_0. \quad (\text{IBC}')$$

Above we dealt with the difficult problem of stating necessary transversality conditions when the time horizon is infinite. The approach was to try a simple straightforward extension of the necessary transversality condition for the finite horizon case to the infinite horizon case. Such an extension is often valid (as it was here), but not always. There is no completely general all-embracing mathematical theorem about the necessary transversality condition for infinite-horizon optimal control problems. So, with infinite horizon problems care must be taken.

The current-value Hamiltonian versus the present-value Hamiltonian

The prefix “current-value” is used to distinguish the current-value Hamiltonian from what is known as the *present-value Hamiltonian*. The latter is defined as $\hat{H} \equiv H e^{-\rho t}$ with $\lambda e^{-\rho t}$ substituted by μ , which is the associated (discounted) adjoint variable. The solution procedure is similar except that step 3 is replaced by $\partial \hat{H} / \partial a = -\dot{\mu}$ and $\lambda(t) e^{-\rho t}$ in the transversality condition is replaced by $\mu(t)$. The two methods are equivalent (and if the discount rate is nil, the formulas for the optimality conditions coincide). But for many economic problems the *current-value* Hamiltonian has the advantage that it makes both the calculations and the interpretation slightly simpler. The adjoint variable, $\lambda(t)$, which as mentioned acts as a shadow price of the state variable, becomes a *current* price along with the other prices in the problem, $w(t)$ and $r(t)$. This is in contrast to $\mu(t)$ which is a *discounted* price.

9.4.3 The Keynes-Ramsey rule

The first-order conditions have interesting implications. Differentiate both sides of (9.39) w.r.t. t to get $u''(c)\dot{c} = \dot{\lambda}$. This equation can be written $u''(c)\dot{c}/u'(c) = \dot{\lambda}/\lambda$ by drawing on (9.39) again. Applying (9.40) now gives

$$\frac{\dot{c}(t)}{c(t)} = \frac{1}{\theta(c(t))} (r(t) - \rho), \quad (9.47)$$

where $\theta(c)$ is the (absolute) *elasticity of marginal utility* w.r.t. consumption,

$$\theta(c) \equiv -\frac{c}{u'(c)} u''(c) > 0. \quad (9.48)$$

As in discrete time, $\theta(c)$ indicates the strength of the consumer’s preference for consumption smoothing. The inverse of $\theta(c)$ measures the *instantaneous intertemporal elasticity of substitution* in consumption, which in turn indicates the willingness to change the time profile of consumption over time when the interest rate changes, see Appendix F.

The result (9.47) says that an optimal consumption plan is characterized in the following way. The household will completely smooth – even out – consumption over time if the rate of time preference equals the real interest rate. The household will choose an upward-sloping time path for consumption if and only if the rate of time preference is less than the real interest rate. In this case the household will have to accept a relatively low level of current consumption with the purpose of enjoying higher consumption in the future. The higher the real interest rate relative to the rate of time preference, the more favorable is it to defer consumption – *everything else equal*. The proviso is important. In addition to




Figure 9.2: Optimal consumption paths for a low and a high constant θ , given a constant $r > \rho$.

the *negative* substitution effect on current consumption of a higher interest rate, there is a *positive* income effect due to the present value of a given intertemporal consumption plan being reduced by a higher interest rate (see (IBC)). On top of this comes a *negative* wealth effect due to a higher interest rate causing a lower present value of expected future labor earnings (again see (IBC)). The special case of a CRRA utility function provides a convenient agenda for sorting these details out, see Example 1 in Section 9.5.

By (9.47) we also see that the greater the elasticity of marginal utility (that is, the greater the curvature of the utility function), the greater the incentive to smooth consumption for a given value of $r(t) - \rho$. The reason for this is that a strong curvature means that the marginal utility will drop sharply if consumption increases, and will rise sharply if consumption decreases. Fig. 9.2 illustrates this in the CRRA case where $\theta(c) = \theta$, a positive constant. For a given constant $r > \rho$, the consumption path chosen when θ is high has lower slope, but starts from a higher level, than when θ is low.

The condition (9.47), which holds for all t within the time horizon whether this is finite or infinite, is referred to as the *Keynes-Ramsey rule*. The name springs from the English mathematician Frank Ramsey who derived the rule in 1928, while his mentor, John Maynard Keynes, suggested a simple and intuitive way of presenting it. The rule is the continuous-time counterpart to the consumption Euler equation in discrete time.

The Keynes-Ramsey rule reflects the general microeconomic principle that the consumer equates the marginal rate of substitution between any two goods to the corresponding price ratio. In the present context the principle is applied to a situation where the “two goods” refer to the same consumption good delivered at two different dates. In Section 9.2 we used the principle to interpret the optimal saving behavior in discrete time. How can the principle be translated into a continuous time setting?

Local optimality in continuous time* Let $(t, t + \Delta t)$ and $(t + \Delta t, t + 2\Delta t)$ be two short successive time intervals. The marginal rate of substitution, $MRS_{t+\Delta t, t}$, of consumption in the second time interval for consumption in the first, is¹⁹

$$MRS_{t+\Delta t, t} \equiv -\frac{dc(t + \Delta t)}{dc(t)} \Big|_{U=\bar{U}} = \frac{u'(c(t))}{e^{-\rho\Delta t}u'(c(t + \Delta t))}, \quad (9.49)$$

approximately. On the other hand, by saving $-\Delta c(t)$ more per time unit (where $\Delta c(t) < 0$) in the short time interval $(t, t + \Delta t)$, one can, via the market, transform $-\Delta c(t) \cdot \Delta t$ units of consumption in this time interval into

$$\Delta c(t + \Delta t) \cdot \Delta t \approx -\Delta c(t)\Delta t e^{\int_t^{t+\Delta t} r(\tau)d\tau} \quad (9.50)$$

units of consumption in the time interval $(t + \Delta t, t + 2\Delta t)$. The marginal rate of transformation is therefore

$$\begin{aligned} MRT_{t+\Delta t, t} &\equiv -\frac{dc(t + \Delta t)}{dc(t)} \Big|_{U=\bar{U}} \approx \\ &= e^{\int_t^{t+\Delta t} r(\tau)d\tau}. \end{aligned}$$

In the optimal plan we must have $MRS_{t+\Delta t, t} = MRT_{t+\Delta t, t}$ which gives

$$\frac{u'(c(t))}{e^{-\rho\Delta t}u'(c(t + \Delta t))} = e^{\int_t^{t+\Delta t} r(\tau)d\tau}, \quad (9.51)$$

approximately. When $\Delta t = 1$ and ρ and $r(t)$ are small, this relation can be approximated by (9.11) from discrete time (generally, by a first-order Taylor approximation, we have $e^x \approx 1 + x$, when x is close to 0).

Taking logs on both sides of (9.51), dividing through by Δt , inserting (9.50), and letting $\Delta t \rightarrow 0$, we get (see Appendix E)

$$\rho - \frac{u''(c(t))}{u'(c(t))}\dot{c}(t) = r(t). \quad (9.52)$$

With the definition of $\theta(c)$ in (9.48), this is exactly the same as the Keynes-Ramsey rule (9.47) which, therefore, is merely an expression of the general optimality condition $MRS = MRT$. When $\dot{c}(t) > 0$, the household is willing to sacrifice some consumption today for more consumption tomorrow only if it is compensated by an interest rate sufficiently above ρ . Naturally, the required compensation is higher, the faster marginal utility declines with rising consumption, i.e., the larger is $(-u''/u')\dot{c}$ already. Indeed, a higher c_t in the future than today implies a lower marginal utility of consumption in the future than of consumption today. Saving of the marginal unit of income today is thus only warranted if the rate of return is sufficiently above ρ , and this is what (9.52) indicates.

¹⁹The underlying analytical steps can be found in Appendix E.

9.4.4 Mangasarian's sufficient conditions

For dynamic optimization problems with one state variable, one control variable, and finite or infinite horizon, the present version of the Maximum Principle delivers a set of first-order conditions and suggests a terminal optimality condition, the transversality condition. The first-order conditions are *necessary* conditions for an interior path to be optimal. With infinite horizon, the necessity of the suggested transversality condition in principle requires a verification in each case. In the present case the verification is implied by Proposition 2. So, up to this point we have only shown that if the consumption/saving problem has an interior solution, then this solution satisfies the Keynes-Ramsey rule and a transversality condition, (TVC').

But are these conditions also *sufficient*? The answer is yes in the present case. This follows from *Mangasarian's sufficiency theorem* (see Math tools) which, applied to the present problem, tells us that if the Hamiltonian is *jointly concave* in (a, c) for every t within the time horizon, then the listed first-order conditions, together with the transversality condition, are also sufficient. Because the instantaneous utility function (the first term in the Hamiltonian) is here strictly concave in c and the second term is linear in (a, c) , the Hamiltonian *is* jointly concave in (a, c) .

To sum up: if we have found a path satisfying the Keynes-Ramsey rule and (TVC'), we have a *candidate solution*. Applying the Mangasarian theorem, we check whether our candidate *is* an optimal solution. In the present optimization problem it is. In fact the strict concavity of the Hamiltonian with respect to the control variable in this problem ensures that the optimal solution is *unique* (Exercise 9.?).

9.5 The consumption function

We have not yet fully solved the saving problem. The Keynes-Ramsey rule gives only the optimal rate of *change* of consumption over time. It says nothing about the *level* of consumption at any given time. In order to determine, for instance, the level $c(0)$, we implicate the solvency condition which limits the amount the household can borrow in the long term. Among the infinitely many consumption paths satisfying the Keynes-Ramsey rule, the household will choose the "highest" one that also fulfils the solvency requirement (NPG). Thus, the household acts so that strict equality in (NPG) obtains. As we saw in Proposition 2, this is equivalent to the transversality condition being satisfied.

EXAMPLE 1 (*constant elasticity of marginal utility; infinite time horizon*). In the problem in Section 9.4.2 with $T \rightarrow \infty$, we consider the case where the elas-

ticity of marginal utility $\theta(c)$, as defined in (9.48), is a constant $\theta > 0$. From Appendix A of Chapter 3 we know that this requirement implies that up to a positive linear transformation the utility function must be of the form:

$$u(c) = \begin{cases} \frac{c^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta}, & \text{when } \theta > 0, \theta \neq 1, \\ \ln c, & \text{when } \theta = 1. \end{cases} \quad (9.53)$$

This is our familiar CRRA utility function. In this case the Keynes-Ramsey rule implies $\dot{c}(t) = \theta^{-1}(r(t) - \rho)c(t)$. Solving this linear differential equation yields

$$c(t) = c(0)e^{\frac{1}{\theta} \int_0^t (r(\tau) - \rho) d\tau}, \quad (9.54)$$

cf. the general accumulation formula, (9.25).

We know from Proposition 2 that the transversality condition is equivalent to the NPG condition being satisfied with strict equality, and from Proposition 1 we know that this condition is equivalent to the intertemporal budget constraint being satisfied with strict equality, i.e.,

$$\int_0^\infty c(t) e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau) d\tau} dt = a_0 + h_0, \quad (\text{IBC}') \quad (9.54)$$

where h_0 is the human wealth,

$$h_0 = \int_0^\infty w(t) e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau) d\tau} dt. \quad (9.55)$$

This result can be used to determine $c(0)$.²⁰ Substituting (9.54) into (IBC') gives

$$c(0) \int_0^\infty e^{\int_0^t [\frac{1}{\theta}(r(\tau) - \rho) - r(\tau)] d\tau} dt = a_0 + h_0.$$

The consumption function is thus

$$\begin{aligned} c(0) &= \beta_0(a_0 + h_0), \quad \text{where} \\ \beta_0 &\equiv \frac{1}{\int_0^\infty e^{\int_0^t [\frac{1}{\theta}(r(\tau) - \rho) - r(\tau)] d\tau} dt} = \frac{1}{\int_0^\infty e^{\frac{1}{\theta} \int_0^t [(1-\theta)r(\tau) - \rho] d\tau} dt} \end{aligned} \quad (9.56)$$

is the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. We have here assumed that these improper integrals over an infinite horizon are bounded from above for all admissible paths. We see that consumption is proportional to total wealth. The factor of proportionality, often called the *marginal propensity to consume out of wealth*, depends on the expected future interest rates and on the preference

²⁰The method also applies if instead of $T = \infty$, we have $T < \infty$.

parameters ρ and θ , that is, the impatience rate and the strength of the preference for consumption smoothing, respectively.

Generally, an increase in the interest rate level, for given total wealth, $a_0 + h_0$, can effect $c(0)$ both positively and negatively.²¹ On the one hand, such an increase makes future consumption cheaper in present value terms. This change in the trade-off between current and future consumption entails a negative *substitution effect* on $c(0)$. On the other hand, the increase in the interest rates decreases the present value of a given consumption plan, allowing for higher consumption both today and in the future, for given total wealth, cf. (IBC'). This entails a positive *pure income effect* on consumption today as consumption is a normal good. If $\theta < 1$ (small curvature of the utility function), the substitution effect will dominate the pure income effect, and if $\theta > 1$ (large curvature), the reverse will hold. This is because the larger is θ , the stronger is the propensity to smooth consumption over time.

In the intermediate case $\theta = 1$ (the logarithmic case) we get from (9.56) that $\beta_0 = \rho$, hence

$$c(0) = \rho(a_0 + h_0). \quad (9.57)$$

In this special case the marginal propensity to consume is time independent and equal to the rate of time preference. For a given *total* wealth, $a_0 + h_0$, current consumption is thus independent of the expected path of the interest rate. That is, in the logarithmic case the *substitution* and *pure income effects* on current consumption exactly offset each other. Yet, on top of this comes the negative *wealth effect* on current consumption of an increase in the interest rate level. The present value of future wage incomes becomes lower (similarly with expected future dividends on shares and future rents in the housing market in a more general setup). Because of this, h_0 (and so $a_0 + h_0$) becomes lower, which adds to the negative substitution effect. Thus, even in the logarithmic case, and *a fortiori* when $\theta < 1$, the *total effect* of an increase in the interest rate level is unambiguously negative on $c(0)$.

If, for example, $r(t) = r$ and $w(t) = w$ (positive constants), we get

$$\begin{aligned} \beta_0 &= [(\theta - 1)r + \rho]/\theta, \\ a_0 + h_0 &= a_0 + w/r. \end{aligned}$$

When $\theta = 1$, the negative effect of a higher r on h_0 is decisive. When $\theta < 1$, a higher r reduces both β_0 and h_0 , hence the total effect on $c(0)$ is even “more

²¹By an increase in the interest rate *level* we mean an upward shift in the time-profile of the interest rate. That is, there is at least one time interval within $[0, \infty)$ where the interest rate is higher than in the original situation and no time interval within $[0, \infty)$ where the interest rate is lower.

negative". When $\theta > 1$, a higher r implies a higher β_0 which more or less offsets the lower h_0 , so that the total effect on $c(0)$ becomes ambiguous. As referred to in Chapter 3, available empirical studies generally suggest a value of θ somewhat above 1. \square

A remark on *fixed-rate loans* and *positive net debt* is appropriate here. Suppose $a_0 < 0$ and assume that this net debt is *not* in the form of a variable-rate loan (as hitherto assumed), but for instance a fixed-rate mortgage loan. Then a rise in the interest rate level implies a lowering of the present value of the debt and thereby *raises* financial wealth and *possibly total wealth*. If so, the rise in the interest rate level implies a *positive* wealth effect on current consumption, thereby "joining" the positive *pure* income effect in *counterbalancing* the negative substitution effect.

EXAMPLE 2 (*constant absolute semi-elasticity of marginal utility; infinite time horizon*). In the problem in Section 9.4.2 with $T \rightarrow \infty$, we consider the case where the sensitivity of marginal utility, measured by the absolute value of the semi-elasticity of marginal utility, $-u''(c)/u'(c) \approx -(\Delta u'/u')/\Delta c$, is a positive constant, α . The utility function must then, up to a positive linear transformation, be of the form,

$$u(c) = -\alpha^{-1}e^{-\alpha c}, \alpha > 0. \quad (9.58)$$

This is known as the CARA utility function (where the name CARA comes from "Constant Absolute Risk Aversion"). The Keynes-Ramsey rule now becomes $\dot{c}(t) = \alpha^{-1}(r(t) - \rho)$. When the interest rate is a constant $r > 0$, we find, through (IBC') and partial integration, $c(0) = r(a_0 + h_0) - (r - \rho)/(\alpha r)$, presupposing $r \geq \rho$ and $a_0 + h_0 > (r - \rho)/(\alpha r^2)$.

This hypothesis of a "constant absolute variability aversion" implies that the degree of *relative* variability aversion is $\theta(c) = \alpha c$ and thus greater, the larger is c . The CARA function has been popular in the theory of behavior under uncertainty. One of the theorems of expected utility theory is that the degree of absolute risk aversion, $-u''(c)/u'(c)$, is proportional to the risk premium which the economic agent will require to be willing to exchange a specified amount of consumption received with certainty for an uncertain amount having the same mean value. Empirically this risk premium seems to be a decreasing function of the level of consumption. Therefore the CARA function is generally considered less realistic than the CRRA function of the previous example. \square

EXAMPLE 3 (*logarithmic utility; finite time horizon; retirement*). We consider a life-cycle saving problem. A worker enters the labor market at time 0 with a financial wealth of 0, has finite lifetime T (assumed known), retires at time $t_1 \in (0, T]$, and does not wish to pass on bequests. For simplicity we assume that $r_t = r > 0$ for all $t \in [0, T]$ and labor income is $w(t) = w > 0$ for $t \in [0, t_1]$, while

$w(t) = 0$ for $t > t_1$. The decision problem is

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{(c(t))_{t=0}^T} U_0 &= \int_0^T (\ln c(t)) e^{-\rho t} dt \quad \text{s.t.} \\ c(t) &\geq 0, \\ \dot{a}(t) &= ra(t) + w(t) - c(t), \quad a(0) = 0, \\ a(T) &\geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

The Keynes-Ramsey rule becomes $\dot{c}_t/c_t = r - \rho$. A solution to the problem will thus fulfil

$$c(t) = c(0)e^{(r-\rho)t}. \quad (9.59)$$

Inserting this into the differential equation for a , we get a first-order linear differential equation the solution of which (for $a(0) = 0$) can be reduced to

$$a(t) = e^{rt} \left[\frac{w}{r}(1 - e^{-rz}) - \frac{c_0}{\rho}(1 - e^{-\rho t}) \right], \quad (9.60)$$

where $z = t$ if $t \leq t_1$, and $z = t_1$ if $t > t_1$. We need to determine $c(0)$. The transversality condition implies $a(T) = 0$. Having $t = T$, $z = t_1$ and $a_T = 0$ in (9.60), we get

$$c(0) = (\rho w/r)(1 - e^{-rt_1})/(1 - e^{-\rho T}). \quad (9.61)$$

Substituting this into (9.59) gives the optimal consumption plan.²²

If $r = \rho$, consumption is constant over time at the level given by (9.61). If, in addition, $t_1 < T$, this consumption level is less than the wage income per year up to t_1 (in order to save for retirement); in the last years the level of consumption is maintained although there is no wage income; the retired person uses up both the return on financial wealth and this wealth itself. \square

The examples illustrate the importance of *forward-looking expectations*, here expectations about future wage income and interest rates. The expectations affect $c(0)$ both through their impact on the marginal propensity to consume (cf. β_0 in Example 1) and through their impact on the present value of expected future labor income (or of expected future dividends on shares or imputed rental income on owner-occupied houses in a more general setup).²³

To avoid misunderstanding: The examples should *not* be interpreted such that for *any* evolution of wages and interest rates there exists a solution to the

²²For $t_1 = T$ and $T \rightarrow \infty$ we get in the limit $c(0) = \rho w/r \equiv \rho h_0$, which is also what (9.56) gives when $a(0) = 0$ and $\theta = 1$.

²³There exist cases where, due to new information, a shift in expectations occurs so that a discontinuity in a responding endogenous variable results. How to deal with such cases is treated in Chapter 11.

household's maximization problem with infinite horizon. There is generally no guarantee that integrals converge and thus have an upper bound for $T \rightarrow \infty$. The evolution of wages and interest rates which prevails in *general equilibrium* is not arbitrary, however. It is determined by the requirement of equilibrium. In turn, of course *existence* of an equilibrium *imposes restrictions* on the utility discount rate relative to the potential growth in instantaneous utility. We shall return to these aspects in the next chapter.

9.6 Concluding remarks

(incomplete)

...

The examples above – and the consumption theory in this chapter in general – should only be seen as a first, simple approximation to actual consumption/saving behavior. One thing is that we have not made a distinction between durable and non-durable consumption goods. More importantly, real world factors such as uncertainty and narrow credit constraints (absence of perfect loan and insurance markets) have been ignored. Debt limits imposed on borrowers are usually much sharper than the NPG condition. When such circumstances are included, current income and expected income in the *near* future tend to become important co-determinants of current consumption, at least for a large fraction of the population with little financial wealth.

Short- and medium-run macro models typically attempt to take into account different kinds of such “frictions”. There is also a growing interest in incorporating psychological factors such as short-sightedness (in one or another form, including present-bias) into macroeconomic theory.

9.7 Literature notes

(incomplete)

In Chapter 6, where the borrower was a “large” agent with fiscal and monetary policy mandates, namely the public sector, satisfying the intertemporal budget constraint was a necessary condition for solvency (when the interest rate exceeds the growth rate of income), but not a sufficient condition. When the modelled borrowers are “small” private agents as in this chapter, the situation is different. Neoclassical models with perfect markets then usually contain equilibrium mechanisms such that the agents' compliance with their intertemporal budget constraint is sufficient for lenders' willingness and ability to supply the demanded finance. See ...

Abel 1990, p. 726-53.

Epstein-Zin preferences. See Poul Schou.

Present-bias and time-inconsistency. Strots (1956). Laibson, QJE 1997: 1, $\alpha\beta, \alpha\beta^2, \dots$

Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) survey the evidence suggesting that the utility discount rate is generally not constant, but declining with the time distance from the current period to the future periods within the horizon. This is known as *hyperbolic discounting*.

The assumptions regarding the underlying intertemporal preferences which allow them to be represented by the present value of period utilities discounted at a constant rate are dealt with by Koopmans (1960), Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982), and – in summary form – by Heal (1998).

Borovika, WP 2013, Recursive preferences, separation of risk aversion and IES.

Deaton, A., *Understanding Consumption*, OUP 1992.

On continuous-time finance, see for instance Merton (1990).

Goldberg (1958).

Allen (1967).

To Math Tools: Rigorous and more general presentations of the Maximum Principle in continuous time applied in economic analysis are available in, e.g., Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987), Sydsæter et al. (2008) and Seierstad and Sydsæter (Optimization Letters, 2009, 3, 507-12).

9.8 Appendix

A. Growth arithmetic in continuous time

Let the variables z, x , and y be differentiable functions of time t . Suppose $z(t)$, $x(t)$, and $y(t)$ are positive for all t . Then:

PRODUCT RULE $z(t) = x(t)y(t) \Rightarrow \dot{z}(t)/z(t) = \dot{x}(t)/x(t) + \dot{y}(t)/y(t)$.

Proof. Taking logs on both sides of the equation $z(t) = x(t)y(t)$ gives $\ln z(t) = \ln x(t) + \ln y(t)$. Differentiation w.r.t. t , using the chain rule, gives the conclusion. \square

The procedure applied in this proof is called “logarithmic differentiation” w.r.t. t : take the log and then the time derivative.

QUOTIENT RULE $z(t) = x(t)/y(t) \Rightarrow \dot{z}(t)/z(t) = \dot{x}(t)/x(t) - \dot{y}(t)/y(t)$.

The proof is similar.

POWER FUNCTION RULE $z(t) = x(t)^\alpha \Rightarrow \dot{z}(t)/z(t) = \alpha\dot{x}(t)/x(t)$.

The proof is similar.

In continuous time these simple formulas are exactly true. In discrete time the analogue formulas are only approximately true and the approximation can be quite bad unless the growth rates of x and y are small, cf. Appendix A to Chapter 4.

B. Average growth and interest rates

Sometimes we may want to express the accumulation formula in continuous time,

$$a(t) = a(0)e^{\int_0^t g(\tau)d\tau}, \quad (9.62)$$

in terms of the arithmetic average of the growth rates in the time interval $[0, t]$. This is defined as $\bar{g}_{0,t} = (1/t) \int_0^t g(\tau)d\tau$. So we can rewrite (9.62) as

$$a(t) = a(0)e^{\bar{g}_{0,t}t}, \quad (9.63)$$

which has form similar to (9.24). Similarly, let $\bar{r}_{0,t}$ denote the arithmetic average of the (short-term) interest rates from time 0 to time t , i.e., $\bar{r}_{0,t} = (1/t) \int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau$. Then we can write the present value of the consumption stream $(c(t))_{t=0}^T$ as $PV = \int_0^T c(t)e^{-\bar{r}_{0,t}t}dt$.

The arithmetic average growth rate, $\bar{g}_{0,t}$, coincides with the average *compound* growth rate from time 0 to time t , that is, the number g satisfying

$$a(t) = a(0)e^{gt}, \quad (9.64)$$

for the same $a(0)$ and $a(t)$ as in (9.63).

There is no similar concordance within discrete time modeling.

Discrete versus continuous compounding Suppose the period length is one year so that the given observations, a_0, a_1, \dots, a_n , are annual data. There are two alternative ways of calculating an average compound growth rate (often just called the “average growth rate”) for the data. We may apply the geometric growth formula,

$$a_n = a_0(1 + G)^n, \quad (9.65)$$

which is natural if the compounding behind the data *is* discrete and occurs for instance quarterly. Or we may apply the exponential growth formula,

$$a_n = a_0e^{gn}, \quad (9.66)$$

corresponding to continuous compounding. Unless $a_n = a_0$ (in which case $g = 0$), the resulting g will be smaller than the average compound growth rate, G , calculated from (9.65) for the same data. Indeed,

$$g = \frac{\ln \frac{a_n}{a_0}}{n} = \ln(1 + G) \lesssim G$$

for G “small”, where “ \lesssim ” means “close to” (by a first-order Taylor approximation about $G = 0$) but “less than” except if $G = 0$. The intuitive reason for “less than” is that a given growth force is more powerful when compounding is continuous. To put it differently: rewriting $(1 + G)^n$ into exponential form gives $(1 + G)^n = (e^{\ln(1+G)})^n = e^{gn} < e^{Gn}$, as $\ln(1 + G) < G$ for all $G \neq 0$.

On the other hand, the difference between G and g is usually unimportant. If for example G refers to the annual GDP growth rate, it will be a small number, and the difference between G and g immaterial. For example, to $G = 0.040$ corresponds $g \approx 0.039$. Even if $G = 0.10$, the corresponding g is 0.0953. But if G stands for the inflation rate and there is high inflation, the difference between G and g will be substantial. During hyperinflation the monthly inflation rate may be, say, $G = 100\%$, but the corresponding g will be only 69%.²⁴

C. Proof of Proposition 1 (about equivalence between the No-Ponzi-Game condition and the intertemporal budget constraint)

We consider the book-keeping relation

$$\dot{a}(t) = r(t)a(t) + w(t) - c(t), \quad (9.67)$$

where $a(0) = a_0$ (given), and the solvency requirement

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} a(t)e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau} \geq 0. \quad (\text{NPG})$$

Technical remark. The expression in (NPG) should be understood to include the possibility that $a(t)e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau} \rightarrow \infty$ for $t \rightarrow \infty$. Moreover, if full generality were aimed at, we should allow for infinitely fluctuating paths in both the (NPG) and (TVC) and therefore replace “ $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty}$ ” by “ $\liminf_{t \rightarrow \infty}$ ”, i.e., the *limit inferior*. The limit inferior for $t \rightarrow \infty$ of a function $f(t)$ on $[0, \infty)$ is defined as $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \inf \{f(s) \mid s \geq t\}$.²⁵ As noted in Appendix E of the previous chapter, however, undamped infinitely fluctuating paths do not turn up in “normal” economic

²⁴Apart from the discrete compounding instead of continuous compounding, a *geometric* growth factor is equivalent to a “corresponding” *exponential* growth factor. Indeed, we can rewrite the growth factor $(1+g)^t$, $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$, into exponential form since $(1+g)^t = (e^{\ln(1+g)})^t = e^{[\ln(1+g)]t}$. Moreover, if g is “small”, we have $e^{[\ln(1+g)]t} \approx e^{gt}$.

²⁵By “inf” is meant *infimum* of the set, that is, the largest number less than or equal to all numbers in the set.

optimization problems, whether in discrete or continuous time. Hence, we apply the simpler concept “lim” rather than “lim inf”. \square

On the background of (9.67), Proposition 1 in the text claimed that (NPG) is equivalent to the intertemporal budget constraint,

$$\int_0^{\infty} c(t)e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau} dt \leq h_0 + a_0, \quad (\text{IBC})$$

being satisfied, where h_0 is defined as in (9.55) and is assumed to be a finite number. In addition, Proposition 1 in Section 9.4 claimed that there is strict equality in (IBC) if and only there is strict equality in (NPG). A plain proof goes as follows.

Proof. Isolate $c(t)$ in (9.67) and multiply through by $e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau}$ to obtain

$$c(t)e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau} = w(t)e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau} - (\dot{a}(t) - r(t)a(t))e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau}.$$

Integrate from 0 to $T > 0$ to get $\int_0^T c(t)e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau} dt$

$$\begin{aligned} &= \int_0^T w(t)e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau} dt - \int_0^T \dot{a}(t)e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau} dt + \int_0^T r(t)a(t)e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau} dt \\ &= \int_0^T w(t)e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau} dt - \left(\left[a(t)e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau} \right]_0^T - \int_0^T a(t)e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau} (-r(t))dt \right) \\ &\quad + \int_0^T r(t)a(t)e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau} dt \\ &= \int_0^T w(t)e^{-\int_0^t r(\tau)d\tau} dt - (a(T)e^{-\int_0^T r(\tau)d\tau} - a(0)), \end{aligned}$$

where the second equality follows from integration by parts. If we let $T \rightarrow \infty$ and use the definition of h_0 and the initial condition $a(0) = a_0$, we get (IBC) if and only if (NPG) holds. It follows that when (NPG) is satisfied with strict equality, so is (IBC), and vice versa. \square

An alternative proof is obtained by using the general solution to a linear inhomogenous first-order differential equation and then let $T \rightarrow \infty$. Since this is a more generally applicable approach, we will show how it works and use it for Claim 1 below (an extended version of Proposition 1) and for the proof of Proposition 2 in the text. Claim 1 will for example prove useful in Exercise 9.1 and in the next chapter.

CLAIM 1 Let $f(t)$ and $g(t)$ be given continuous functions of time, t . Consider the differential equation

$$\dot{x}(t) = g(t)x(t) + f(t), \quad (9.68)$$

with $x(t_0) = x_{t_0}$, a given initial value. Then the inequality

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} x(t) e^{-\int_{t_0}^t g(s) ds} \geq 0 \quad (9.69)$$

is equivalent to

$$-\int_{t_0}^{\infty} f(\tau) e^{-\int_{t_0}^{\tau} g(s) ds} d\tau \leq x_{t_0}. \quad (9.70)$$

Moreover, if and only if (9.69) is satisfied with strict equality, then (9.70) is satisfied with strict equality.

Proof. The linear differential equation (9.68) has the solution

$$x(t) = x(t_0) e^{\int_{t_0}^t g(s) ds} + \int_{t_0}^t f(\tau) e^{\int_{\tau}^t g(s) ds} d\tau. \quad (9.71)$$

Multiplying through by $e^{-\int_{t_0}^t g(s) ds}$ yields

$$x(t) e^{-\int_{t_0}^t g(s) ds} = x(t_0) + \int_{t_0}^t f(\tau) e^{-\int_{t_0}^{\tau} g(s) ds} d\tau.$$

By letting $t \rightarrow \infty$, it can be seen that if and only if (9.69) is true, we have

$$x(t_0) + \int_{t_0}^{\infty} f(\tau) e^{-\int_{t_0}^{\tau} g(s) ds} d\tau \geq 0.$$

Since $x(t_0) = x_{t_0}$, this is the same as (9.70). We also see that if and only if (9.69) holds with strict equality, then (9.70) also holds with strict equality. \square

COROLLARY Let n be a given constant and let

$$h_{t_0} \equiv \int_{t_0}^{\infty} w(\tau) e^{-\int_{t_0}^{\tau} (r(s)-n) ds} d\tau, \quad (9.72)$$

which we assume is a finite number. Then, given the flow budget identity

$$\dot{a}(t) = (r(t) - n)a(t) + w(t) - c(t), \quad \text{where } a(t_0) = a_{t_0}, \quad (9.73)$$

it holds that

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} a(t) e^{-\int_{t_0}^t (r(s)-n) ds} \geq 0 \Leftrightarrow \int_{t_0}^{\infty} c(\tau) e^{-\int_{t_0}^{\tau} (r(s)-n) ds} d\tau \leq a_{t_0} + h_{t_0}, \quad (9.74)$$

where a strict equality on the left-hand side of “ \Leftrightarrow ” implies a strict equality on the right-hand side, and vice versa.

Proof. In (9.68), (9.69), and (9.70), let $x(t) = a(t)$, $g(t) = r(t) - n$ and $f(t) = w(t) - c(t)$. Then the conclusion follows from Claim 1. \square

By setting $t_0 = 0$ in the corollary and replacing τ by t and n by 0, we have hereby provided an alternative proof of Proposition 1.

D. Proof of Proposition 2 (the household's necessary transversality condition with an infinite time horizon)

In the differential equation (9.68) we let $x(t) = \lambda(t)$, $g(t) = -(r(t) - \rho)$, and $f(t) = 0$. This gives the linear differential equation $\dot{\lambda}(t) = (\rho - r(t))\lambda(t)$, which is identical to the first-order condition (9.40) in Section 9.4. The solution is

$$\lambda(t) = \lambda(t_0)e^{-\int_{t_0}^t (r(s) - \rho) ds}.$$

Substituting this into (TVC) in Section 9.4 yields

$$\lambda(t_0) \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} a(t) e^{-\int_{t_0}^t (r(s) - \rho) ds} = 0. \quad (9.75)$$

From the first-order condition (9.39) in Section 9.4 we have $\lambda(t_0) = u'(c(t_0)) > 0$ so that $\lambda(t_0)$ in (9.75) can be ignored. Thus, (TVC) in Section 9.4 is equivalent to the condition that (NPG) in that section is satisfied with strict equality (let $t_0 = 0 = n$). This proves (ii) of Proposition 2 in the text. \square

E. Intertemporal consumption smoothing

We claimed in Section 9.4 that equation (9.49) gives approximately the marginal rate of substitution of consumption in the time interval $(t + \Delta t, t + 2\Delta t)$ for consumption in $(t, t + \Delta t)$. This can be seen in the following way. To save notation we shall write our time-dependent variables as c_t , r_t , etc., even though they are continuous functions of time. The contribution from the two time intervals to the criterion function is

$$\begin{aligned} \int_t^{t+2\Delta t} u(c_\tau) e^{-\rho\tau} d\tau &\approx e^{-\rho t} \left(\int_t^{t+\Delta t} u(c_t) e^{-\rho(\tau-t)} d\tau + \int_{t+\Delta t}^{t+2\Delta t} u(c_{t+\Delta t}) e^{-\rho(\tau-t)} d\tau \right) \\ &= e^{-\rho t} \left(u(c_t) \left[\frac{e^{-\rho(\tau-t)}}{-\rho} \right]_t^{t+\Delta t} + u(c_{t+\Delta t}) \left[\frac{e^{-\rho(\tau-t)}}{-\rho} \right]_{t+\Delta t}^{t+2\Delta t} \right) \\ &= \frac{e^{-\rho t} (1 - e^{-\rho\Delta t})}{\rho} [u(c_t) + u(c_{t+\Delta t}) e^{-\rho\Delta t}]. \end{aligned}$$

Requiring unchanged utility integral $U_0 = \bar{U}_0$ is thus approximately the same as requiring $\Delta[u(c_t) + u(c_{t+\Delta t}) e^{-\rho\Delta t}] = 0$, which by carrying through the differentiation and rearranging gives (9.49).

The instantaneous local optimality condition, equation (9.52), can be interpreted on the basis of (9.51). Take logs on both sides of (9.51) to get

$$\ln u'(c_t) + \rho\Delta t - \ln u'(c_{t+\Delta t}) = \int_t^{t+\Delta t} r_\tau d\tau.$$

Dividing by Δt , substituting (9.50), and letting $\Delta t \rightarrow 0$ we get

$$\rho - \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{\ln u'(c_{t+\Delta t}) - \ln u'(c_t)}{\Delta t} = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{R_{t+\Delta t} - R_t}{\Delta t}, \quad (9.76)$$

where R_t is the antiderivative of r_t . By the definition of a time derivative, (9.76) can be written

$$\rho - \frac{d \ln u'(c_t)}{dt} = \frac{dR_t}{dt}.$$

Carrying out the differentiation, we get

$$\rho - \frac{1}{u'(c_t)} u''(c_t) \dot{c}_t = r_t,$$

which was to be shown.

F. Elasticity of intertemporal substitution in continuous time

The relationship between the elasticity of marginal utility and the concept of *instantaneous elasticity of intertemporal substitution* in consumption can be exposed in the following way: consider an indifference curve for consumption in the non-overlapping time intervals $(t, t + \Delta t)$ and $(s, s + \Delta t)$. The indifference curve is depicted in Fig. 9.3. The consumption path outside the two time intervals is kept unchanged. At a given point $(c_t \Delta t, c_s \Delta t)$ on the indifference curve, the marginal rate of substitution of s -consumption for t -consumption, MRS_{st} , is given by the absolute slope of the tangent to the indifference curve at that point. In view of $u''(c) < 0$, MRS_{st} is rising along the curve when c_t decreases (and thereby c_s increases).

Conversely, we can consider the ratio c_s/c_t as a function of MRS_{st} along the given indifference curve. The elasticity of this consumption ratio w.r.t. MRS_{st} as we move along the given indifference curve then indicates the *elasticity of substitution* between consumption in the time interval $(t, t + \Delta t)$ and consumption in the time interval $(s, s + \Delta t)$. Denoting this elasticity by $\sigma(c_t, c_s)$, we thus have:

$$\sigma(c_t, c_s) = \frac{MRS_{st}}{c_s/c_t} \frac{d(c_s/c_t)}{dMRS_{st}} \approx \frac{\frac{\Delta(c_s/c_t)}{c_s/c_t}}{\frac{\Delta MRS_{st}}{MRS_{st}}}.$$

At an optimum point, MRS_{st} equals the ratio of the discounted prices of good t and good s . Thus, the elasticity of substitution can be interpreted as approximately equal to the percentage increase in the ratio of the chosen goods, c_s/c_t , generated by a one percentage increase in the inverse price ratio, holding the utility level and the amount of other goods unchanged. If $s = t + \Delta t$ and the




Figure 9.3: Substitution of s -consumption for t -consumption as MRS_{st} increases to MRS'_{st} .

interest rate from date t to date s is r , then (with continuous compounding) this price ratio is $e^{r\Delta t}$, cf. (9.51). Inserting MRS_{st} from (9.49) with $t + \Delta t$ replaced by s , we get

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma(c_t, c_s) &= \frac{u'(c_t)/[e^{-\rho(s-t)}u'(c_s)]}{c_s/c_t} \frac{d(c_s/c_t)}{d\{u'(c_t)/[e^{-\rho(s-t)}u'(c_s)]\}} \\ &= \frac{u'(c_t)/u'(c_s)}{c_s/c_t} \frac{d(c_s/c_t)}{d(u'(c_t)/u'(c_s))},\end{aligned}\quad (9.77)$$

since the factor $e^{-\rho(t-s)}$ cancels out.

We now interpret the d 's in (9.77) as differentials (recall, the differential of a differentiable function $y = f(x)$ is denoted dy and defined as $dy = f'(x)dx$ where dx is some arbitrary real number). Calculating the differentials we get

$$\sigma(c_t, c_s) \approx \frac{u'(c_t)/u'(c_s)}{c_s/c_t} \frac{(c_t dc_s - c_s dc_t)/c_t^2}{[u'(c_s)u''(c_t)dc_t - u'(c_t)u''(c_s)dc_s]/u'(c_s)^2}.$$

Hence, for $s \rightarrow t$ we get $c_s \rightarrow c_t$ and

$$\sigma(c_t, c_s) \rightarrow \frac{c_t(dc_s - dc_t)/c_t^2}{u'(c_t)u''(c_t)(dc_t - dc_s)/u'(c_t)^2} = -\frac{u'(c_t)}{c_t u''(c_t)} \equiv \tilde{\sigma}(c_t).$$

This limiting value is known as the *instantaneous elasticity of intertemporal substitution* of consumption. It reflects the opposite of the preference for consumption smoothing. Indeed, we see that $\tilde{\sigma}(c_t) = 1/\theta(c_t)$, where $\theta(c_t)$ is the elasticity of marginal utility at the consumption level $c(t)$.

9.9 Exercises

9.1 We look at a household (or dynasty) with infinite time horizon. The household's labor supply is inelastic and grows at the constant rate $n > 0$. The household has a constant rate of time preference $\rho > n$ and the individual instantaneous utility function is $u(c) = c^{1-\theta}/(1-\theta)$, where θ is a positive constant. There is no uncertainty. The household maximizes the integral of per capita utility discounted at the rate $\rho - n$. Set up the household's optimization problem. Show that the optimal consumption plan satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} c(0) &= \beta_0(a_0 + h_0), & \text{where} \\ \beta_0 &= \frac{1}{\int_0^\infty e^{\int_0^t \left(\frac{(1-\theta)r(\tau)-\rho}{\theta} + n\right) d\tau} dt}, & \text{and} \\ h_0 &= \int_0^\infty w(t) e^{-\int_0^t (r(\tau)-n) d\tau} dt, \end{aligned}$$

where $w(t)$ is the real wage per unit of labor and otherwise the same notation as in this chapter is used. *Hint:* apply the corollary to Claim 1 in Appendix C and the method of Example 1 in Section 9.5. As to h_0 , start by considering

$$H_0 \equiv h_0 L_0 = \int_0^\infty w(t) L_t e^{-\int_0^t (r(\tau)-n) d\tau} dt$$

and apply that $L(t) = L_0 e^{nt}$.

